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Council held in Istanbul, United Cities and
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inclusive cities of the 21st-century”.
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UCLG’s Social Inclusion and Participative
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favour of social inclusion policies,
considered as a safeguard of citizens’
rights, necessary to achieve a vibrant and
effective local democracy, respectful toward
the growing diversity of urban societies.
Ultimately, the manifesto depicts a global
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relationship between social inclusion and
participatory democracy, the UCLG’s Social
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61. Introduction
1.1 Markets, democracy and exclusion: a
Janus-faced globalization
“The historical form of democracy consolidated in the city
(...) favours the short-term; (...) it promotes the interests
of a pluralist political class system and its associated
power groups when the city (...) requires the
reconstruction of general interest; it rewards the
mercantile powers who haven’t prioritized an agenda of
development and social inequality. (...) Pragmatically, it
promotes electoral citizenship and leaves market dynamics
to wear down social citizenship”1.
When the market becomes the determining factor in establishing
the scope and guarantees of social citizenship, it is pertinent to
look at the political sphere and wonder to what extent democratic
governments have renounced their initial mission and essential
reason for existing in the first place; namely to represent the
people, responding to the needs and demands of all citizens. This
question is both relevant and necessary, and the consequences of
abandoning it are enormous.
We might find certain consolation in the fact that the case of
Mexico City, referred to in the above quotation by Carlos San Juan,
might seem us to be situated at the negative end of the spectrum
in terms of poverty, social inequality and corruption. But that
portrayal is not exactly accurate. In certain aspects, Mexico is a
modern country with remarkable economic growth, and its
governmental institutions, led by those of its capital city, have
made innovations in public management with regard to
transparency and participation which were inconceivable until very
recently. Nevertheless, it seems that these developments are not
enough to offset the battering which comes at the hands of a
globalisation expressed almost exclusively through the market and
a democratic policy apparently incapable of overcoming certain
structural faults.
Similar diagnoses could be made in a large number of world cities
and the growing metropolitan areas that surround them. Departing
from Brazilian and Spanish case studies, Fleury, Blanco and
Subirats (2008) touch a sore spot when they point out that a
hyper-mobile and hyper-flexible global capitalism, along with
economic growth and extraordinary opportunities for certain elites
and certain regions of the world to become wealthier, produces
economic dislocation, job insecurity, inequality, social
fragmentation, criminality, insecurity and corruption, not to
mention accelerated environmental destruction. The distribution of
the profits and losses of globalisation is also strongly biased in
terms of factors such as gender, age, country of origin, cultural
and religious values, sexual orientation and, last but not least,
place of residence; all these elements become potential factors for
discrimination. The economic crisis affecting large part of the
planet since 2007 hasn’t changed the basic features of the system,
but it has reduced the circle of its beneficiaries and expanded the
circle of its victims, in addition to limiting the capacity of
governments on all levels to tackle economic and social problems
through their own policies2.
Economic globalisation is neither the only cause nor the only
visible manifestation of the changing times we are experiencing,
characterised by sharp increases in mobility, flexibility and
uncertainty. The development of scientific knowledge and the
multiple technological applications derived from it, together with
the deep social changes caused by the erosion of traditional
authorities, as well as the acceptance of pluralism and the
growing individualisation of life courses, interact with the
economic transformations, mutually strengthening each other and
reaching an enormous transformative power. We will neither
discuss which of these factors the primary cause of this situation
is, nor draw connections to old discussions between idealism and
materialism and its different variants3. What is important for us
here is to see that all these factors, to a greater or lesser extent,
entail clear opportunities for human societies to progress as well
as side-effects that might jeopardize their health and welfare in
the long term.
1 San Juan a: Álvarez/San Juan/Sánchez M., p. 33.
2 For more on this topic, see UCLG’s report entitled “The Impact of the Global Crisis
on Local Governments”.
3 See Harris for more on this topic.
7The balance between opportunities and risks turning out positive
depends to a large extent on society’s ability to: 1. Become
aware of the existence of these opportunities and risks; 2.
Generate skills to take advantage of the former and prevent the
latter; and 3. Redistribute costs and benefits to create a socially
equitable result. This cannot be taken for granted; on the
contrary, it requires it requires a high degree of social awareness
and political activity in all spheres of society. Expressing
political processes through true democratic institutions (which
involves defining problems, drawing up and discussing
alternative actions, and making decisions) is a highly demanding
task that consumes valuable resources (including skills, energy,
and time, among others) which are not always available in
sufficient quantities.
The time factor is particularly significant. Technological, economic
and social changes take place at a much faster pace than politics
is usually able to respond to them, and with such quickly moving
targets, it is quite difficult to aim and actually hit the target.
Luttwark (1999) brought to light the fact that the “turbo-
capitalist” economy, which is more global than national, can move
much faster than politics, which is still deeply tied to the concept
of the Nation State. Taming turbo-capitalism requires two
complementary paths: to make politics more able to respond to
change in due time and to slow the pace of technological and
economic transformations when society, through democratic
discussion, considers this to be necessary.
Even though the “subtle ideology of economicism”4 repeatedly
conjures up in public opinion a perverse association between
stability and stagnation, we know that certain levels of personal
and social stability are necessary for well-being, progress and even
for society’s very reproduction5. Uncertainty is part of the human
condition, but nevertheless people should be able to build their
life courses with a certain perspective of the future, without being
permanently anguished about losing their jobs, their homes or
their pensions from one day to the next. Changes are inherent to
life, but the way and the pace in which we (must) adapt,
individually and collectively, should depend more on our own
decisions.
The hypothesis that structural economic factors should bend to a
certain political direction may seem aberrant after so many years
of seeing a completely unrestricted, global expansion of
productive and financial capital as the only possible model. It is
nevertheless legitimate to consider this option from the moment
we see that the transformations associated with globalisation may
undermine the economic and social stability of a large majority of
the world’s population. Without ethical criteria and political
leadership, economic globalisation leads us to ever shorter and
more pronounced cycles of wealth creation and destruction. The
most obvious example of this is the current global crisis, which
started in the real estate and finance sectors but ended up
damaging most whole of the economy.
In fact, the present crisis has three distinctive sides; it is an
economic, a social and and an ecological crisis. As Paehlke first
noted in 20036, the “race to the bottom” unleashed by
unregulated market globalisation could lead to a three-
dimensional disaster by means of social and ecological dumping.
Nevertheless, we do not stick to a catastrophist worldview;
although the situation in most countries ranges from tragedy to
precariousness, we believe that humanity still has the leeway to
manoeuvre and sufficient tools to correct things. To start to do
this, however, we must first be clear about the fact that we are
not facing a temporary crisis, something that will pass away and
will allow us to go back to business as usual, to the previous
balance between representative democracy, welfare state and
global capitalism. We are approaching a new scenario, one that
will require new conceptual frameworks for understanding and
new tools to act in ways that produce more appropriate
responses.
4 Paehlke, pp. 141-147.
5 Stability is also necessary for the full exercise of democratic politics in all its
dimensions, from a simple vote (which drops considerably in contexts of high
residential mobility) to the participation in and of groups. This is even more
important if we talk about generating collective leadership, which requires not only
a solid contextual awareness, acquired over time, but also a certain degree of
commitment.
6 Paehlke, pp. 141-147.
81.2 Social Inclusion and Participatory
Democracy: two successful concepts
lacking critical review
Social inclusion and participatory democracy are two successful
buzzwords in today's political discourse. After centuries of
autocratic, strongly non-participatory and exclusive regimes, we can
only be happy about their apparently unquestionable triumph. A
priori, social inclusion and participatory democracy could be the key
building blocks on which to construct a new version of the ideal
society adapted to the conditions of our new times; a plausible
story with a clear normative underpinning. But things are not so
simple. When a word becomes successful in the political sphere, it is
taken over by contending groups, which make use of it, and
eventually abuse it, until its original meaning or meanings become
blurred. In some cases the relation between the word and the
original concept can be deeply modified.
The paradigm of inclusion, for example, has managed to displace
the previous paradigm of class conflict, inherited from historical
materialism, from large parts of academy and politics. This new
paradigm surely enables the new social realities to be explained
better than through the theories rooted in Marxism, and it has a
great potential for being a critical, transforming approach. However,
the fact that in the discourse of inclusion the problem might be
largely defined as the separation of certain people and groups from
“normal” society, rather than as the existence of structural, class
and group interests and conflicts, has made it attractive also to
liberal and conservative thought and politics. All in all, social
inclusion has triumphed as a political objective, jumping over
ideological boundaries, thanks to a plasticity which entails the risk
of being the object of diverse political uses, whose goals might
even be in conflict with each other.
In the preceding decades, the concept of citizen participation has
also enjoyed similar success. The main political actors took it up,
albeit often superficially, as a way to improve a model of
representative democracy that did not quite meet the expectations
of the public in regard to the proximity and effectiveness of
democratic institutions in dealing with citizens’ problems and
concerns. However, after a powerful participatory wave led to
(especially local-level) proliferation of regulations, participative
bodies and processes in almost every sphere of public policy, many
doubts arose with regard to the impacts of citizen participation on
the quality of public policy and democracy itself.
At their core, social inclusion and participatory democracy are
concepts that were created to explain and help to transform the
complex reality of our times. Operating in a complex system, it is
logical that we should be faced by ambiguous definitions,
contradictory meanings and unexpected collateral effects. Therefore,
before reflecting on the theoretical and practical relationship
between both ideas, we must thoroughly examine their possibilities,
criticisms and general validity.
1.3 The local perspective
“Local governments play a key role in a globalised world where most
of the population lives in cities and metropolitan areas”7. The very
first sentence of the “Let’s build the Inclusive Cities of the 21st
Century” policy paper combines a controversial statement halfway
between desire and reality (the concept of local governments as
leading political players) with a statement that is absolutely
relevant and indisputable: cities throughout the world are
experiencing continuous and (apparently) unstoppable growth, to
the extent that already the majority of human population lives in
them. Along with people, cities gather (material and symbolic)
resources and social inequalities, memory and uprooting, risks and
opportunities, and the constantly increasing circulation of people,
goods and ideas. If the global world is Janus-faced, its cities even
more so. Indeed, cities are the main battlefield in the fight for
democracy, participation and inclusion.
The globalized world is also characterised by a clear reappraisal of
space as an object of analysis. In the 20th century, at the peak of
modernity, time –linear and progress-bringing– seemed to be the
only relevant dimension in terms of historical, social and political
analysis; this was reflected very well via the categorization of
“advanced” vs. delayed (modern vs. ancient), which was equivalent
to saying developed vs. underdeveloped. For both, capitalist and
communist approaches to development, everything was “a
question of time”, whether talking about Honduras or Nicaragua,
about Mozambique or Kenya. After the changes which started in
1989 and culminated in 2001, space, which is to say each place
with its unique and non replicable context, recovered its lost
protagonism8.
In this vein, thinkers such as Castells and Borja (2004), Le Galés
(2002) and others have contributed to crafting and disseminating a
discourse built around the dialectic between the local and the
global, smartly captured in the neologism “glocal”. In fact we are
experiencing a localised globalisation in which old cities recover at
least part of their past relevance, and new ones become more self-
confident. The planet’s large cities are not (yet) leading players on
7 Barcelona City Hall, p. 31.
8 Proponents of this view, which we call “spatial turn” (Schlôgel, 2003), see the U.S.
government’s “spatial blindness” as the principal cause of the failure of the
operation to “bring democracy to the Middle East”.
9the world stage, but they do have more leeway to manoeuvre to
develop their own strategies and policies than they did just 30 or
40 years ago.
To put it clearly, democracy, participation and inclusion must not
only be conceived of abstractly but also be applied to specific
spaces. Consequently, although the subjects of this paper are
universally valid, we have tried to maintain a local (and specifically
urban) perspective throughout the text. This is especially clear in
its final section, which offers specific local policy proposals on the
basis of previously drawn conclusions.
1.4 Approach and structure of the document
This research stems primarily from the initiative and work done by
UCLG’s Social Inclusion and Participatory Democracy Commission.
Taking its published statements as a starting point, we proceeded to
critically review the question of participation and democratic
inclusion on the local level. Decided to avoid a merely
administrative or managerial approach to the problem, which would
make it possible to hide or relativise key aspects for improving
democratic quality, we chose to broaden our focus, in order to track
the very definition of inclusion and democracy as political problems
writ large.
The first question we address is whether the existence of a more
participatory democracy (which is assumed to be a better
democracy) is an institutional precondition for making progress
towards more inclusive cities. Our intuition says it is, but to
somehow test our hypothesis we need to first consider some
preliminary theoretical information about the concepts which
underlie it. In other words, we need to evaluate the existing
discourse on social inclusion and participatory democracy. After
doing so we will be ready to answer a second, much more applied
question about concrete ways to incorporate citizen participation in
inclusion policies drawn up in a democratic framework, in order to
make them more legitimate and effective.
The document is organised into three sections. Section one critically
reviews inclusion, exploring the origins of the paradigm and
assessing its pros and cons. This leads us to examine the different
meanings attributed to it and discourses around it in greater detail,
in order to arrive at a valid, feasible inclusion formula which suits
the highly volatile, complex environment of contemporary urban
societies. Section two analyzes the relationship between inclusion
and democracy, stressing the participatory dimension of democracy.
Finally, section three applies the theoretical insights of sections one
and two to suggest specific principles and policies to foster
participatory and inclusive societies.
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2. Inclusion as a regulatory ideal and political project in 21st-century
urban societies
The purpose of this study is to identify suitable institutional designs
and lines of action to promote social inclusion. But what is social
inclusion? What does it imply? And why do we have to make a
political objective of it? To find the answers, we must first go to
the origins of the problem and examine the concept that intends to
explain it. We focus not on far-off origins (which would also be
worth considering) but rather on much more recent developments,
in the transition from the first to the second modernity, when
exclusion began to replace poverty as the main social problem to be
fought. The emergence of a new society makes it necessary to revise
and update social inclusion as a normative benchmark and as a
political project.
2.1 The concept of social exclusion
The concept of social exclusion appears in social sciences as a reply
to the aforementioned structural transformation of urban societies,
which came about as a result of economic globalisation,
technological developments and the reconsideration of essential
elements of the social structure such as family and class. In the
1970s, when the transition to this new period began, social
scientists first started to speak of social exclusion as a concept
allowing us to package and label the effects that such changes were
having on the most disadvantaged people and social groups.
We may define social exclusion as refusing people and/or social
groups’ access to the resources which, in a specific place and at a
specific historical time, are considered socially valuable and
necessary for a dignified and autonomous life. Social exclusion
hinders people to develop themselves in accordance with their
wishes and abilities.
In fact, social exclusion is not a new phenomenon, but rather one
which is found in the very processes of differentiation, distinction
and stratification which have been present in the immense majority
of societies across the history of mankind. And we must be aware
that in the 21st Century societies are still structured around unequal
relationships and inclusion-exclusion patterns, at all levels and in
all fields of activity. To a large extent inequality is justified on the
grounds of personal characteristics that have been negatively
connoted and/or placed in a position of inferiority by groups
holding a larger share of power; we refer to dimensions such as
class or social caste, gender, age, nationality, ethnicity, religion,
sexual orientation or certain physical or mental disabilities, amongst
others. Unfortunately, the same diversity that is the basis of a
complex and richly multifaceted society is used as a mechanism of
discrimination and oppression.
Discrimination and oppression, however, cannot automatically be
equated with exclusion. Historically, even the most disadvantaged
social classes and groups have, under certain circumstances, been
able to produce their own frameworks of inclusion, based on modes
of subsistence and specific cultural features. Though precarious and
often at the limit of subsistence, these milieux, such as the feudal
peasantry or the industrial proletariat, gave sense and a certain
coherence to both individual lives and struggles for emancipation.
Nevertheless, modern times imply new elements that tend to break
down this kind of inclusive structures and practices.
In this point, we must place the structural crisis affecting
employment in a pre-eminent place. When technological
developments allow us to do away with human work in most
economic sectors, from agriculture to services, yet new manners of
production are not able to provide new jobs to compensate for the
losses caused by more and more intensive use of capital, the
result in a large part of the world will be a big surplus on
available workforce. Although this could change in the long term,
due to overall population’s aging, currently there are hundreds of
millions of people who are apparently of no productive use for the
global economic system. And given the centrality of the economy
in the social organisation of capitalism, a lack of a clear, precise
economic role easily gives way to the impossibility of assuming
family and social roles9.
9 An analysis of the fullest possible consequences of this phenomenon leads to think
of “extinguishable populations”, something which the system achieves by denying
citizens basic rights (see: Bialakowsky, López and Patrouilleau: “Prácticas
gubernamentales en la regulación de poblaciones extinguibles”, in Cimadamore &
Cattani, pp. 147-190).
11
Closely related to this economic factor is another disruptive factor,
highly associated with the second or “liquid modernity” (Bauman,
2007): social links become fragile, leading to a significant risk of
erosion and loss of affective, cognitive and normative points of
contact between individuals and society. While a discussion of the
causes of this complex and ambivalent phenomenon, both
potentially liberating and devastating10, falls outside the scope of
this work, we can mention its consequences: on the one hand, we
see the deep crisis of solid models of behaviour (whether these
stem from tradition, religion, or subcultures of class or professions)
and on the other hand, even more importantly, we see the
precarisation of personal and family relationships, friendships,
workplace and neighbourhood acquaintances, etc. The scarcity or,
in the worst cases, the prolonged absence of significant personal
bonds and benchmarks may lead people —even those starting in
somewhat privileged economic and social situations— to “misled”
life courses, where they are expelled or excluded from access to the
tangible and intangible resources that are the source of personal
well-being.
We are therefore confronted to a series of possible causes of
exclusion. We may distinguish between those derived from structural
factors of inequality and those derived from individual conscious
decisions that we might label as “wrong” (for example deciding not
to pursue education, not to build social bonds, or not to take care
of one's health) in terms of the consequences they end up having
on an individual. Which causes are more significant for explaining
exclusion?
The case for equality before the law has certainly made significant
progress in the world at large —to the extent that today the most
extreme forms of discrimination and oppression are unacceptable in
most countries. Furthermore, the aforementioned process of
individualisation logically increases the number of key individual
decisions (whether or not to study, get married, emigrate,
participate in politics, etc.) not determined by group or community
rules.
However, social stratification still exists in all countries, for example
in social institutions and practices that favour (a greater or lesser
amount of) inequality in the job market, in access to basic services,
in political decision-making or even in finding a partner. It is also
true that the majority of seemingly individual decisions are strongly
conditioned by the structure of opportunities perceived by each
person when making them, and that these perceptions are
generated within specific social structures prey to the
aforementioned discriminatory logics11.
In the emerging globalised societies, characterised by classical
elements (weakened and yet persistent stratification and
discrimination) and new elements that gain relevance (the absence
of direction and bonds) we consider that the inclusion/exclusion
(inside/outside) duality, begs a more complete and accurate
explanation of reality than the simple “up/down” duality (which
would be a better depiction of an industrial class society where
everyone has a place, though these places might be quite unequal).
In the context of this theoretical framework, social exclusion is
identified as the typical social pathology of the new society. Though
exclusion is most often used in connection with the adjective
“social”, it is in fact considered a “total” phenomenon with multiple
facets (economic, political, cultural, etc.). Being extremely dynamic,
exclusion could potentially affect any person at any time in her
live.
So far, we have talked about the origin and the ultimate causes of
exclusion, but now we want to address its primary causes, the
factors favouring exclusion. The following table presents the
numerous factors of exclusion which apply to different areas of life
in combination with the structural “axes” of inequality. It should
help us to contextualize the phenomenon’s true complexity.
10 Of all the words that have been proposed as possible names for this phenomena,
the one that fits us best is “Multioptional society”, proposed by Swiss sociologist
Peter Gross (1994). This phenomenon surely includes the acceptance of the freedom
of awareness and choice, the technological developments that break barriers and
multiply options, and capitalism’s rapid commoditisation or “colonisation” of the
spaces of daily life (Habermas, 2000).
11 For more on this topic, see Puyol (2010, pp.  203-221). The most obvious proof of
this phenomenon is that the main factor which statistically explains a young
person’s choice of a specific educational or professional path is the combination of
cultural capital and professional expectations passed on to this individual by
his/her parents.
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• Economic poverty
• Financial difficulties
• Dependence on social insurance
• No social protection
• Unemployment
• Underemployment
• Lack of job qualifications / no qualifications
• Cannot work
• Job instability
• No education / no access to compulsory education
• Illiteracy / low level of education
• Failure
• Dropping out 
• Linguistic barriers
• No access to health care or basic social health resources
• Addictions and related illnesses
• Infectious diseases
• Mental illness, disabilities or other chronic illnesses causing dependence
• No home of one’s own
• Homes which lack basic services (water, electricity, etc.)
• Precarious access to housing
• Poor housing conditions
• Poor living conditions (i.e. overcrowding)
• Deteriorated urban areas lacking basic services
• Breakdown of family networks (conflict or violence in the family)
• Limited or weak family networks (single parenthood, loneliness, etc.)
• Limited or weak social networks
• Social rejection or stigmatisation
• No access to citizenship
• Restricted access to citizenship
• Deprivation of rights through criminal process
• No political and social participation
Source: Subirats (2004)
Table 1: An overview of social exclusion
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For a better understanding of the phenomenon the multiple causes
of exclusion are usually grouped into three main areas which
correspond to the three large dimensions or spheres of life:
economic, political and relational.
When is a person to be considered as “excluded”? The answer will
logically depend on what we understand by social inclusion. If we
assume that exclusion/inclusion is not a binary category, but rather
a matter of degree that admits shades and alternatives, it is very
difficult to establish a series of standard indicators valid for
everyone. For the sake of simplicity we are going to divide the
spectrum included/excluded in four distinctive categories:
1. People in a state of exclusion;
2. People at risk of exclusion;
3. People in a state of vulnerability; 
4. People in a state of more or less comfortable inclusion.
Bearing in mind the large number of factors of exclusion, the
diversity of situations in which each person can find herself is
enormous. Of course, this diversity is strongly limited by the
structural processes of inequality in each society; generally the
people endowed with more economic resources are also those which
enjoy more and more diverse social relations, higher degrees of
education, better health and so on. Nevertheless, situations are not
always homogeneous in all spheres and throughout a persons’ live.
The “normality” of exclusion can also be broken; indeed, breaking it
is one of the main goals (if not the main goal) of inclusion policies.
The following chart characterises each of the four categories and
how they can be identified in each of the three principal spheres of
exclusion.
Figure 1. Exclusion and key spheres
Category Economic sphere Community sphere Political sphere
Exclusion
Economic – market sphere
economic superfluousness / insecurity
Political – redistributive sphere
political disaffiliation / no access
to social rights
Relational – community sphere
individualisation / isolation
Source: Fleury, Subirats and Blanco, 2008.
Source: Author
People in a
state of
exclusion:
People at
risk of
exclusion
People in a
state of vul-
nerability
People in a
state of
more or less
comfortable
inclusion
Do not have access to basic goods and
services (and may not even have access
to a home).
Run up debts; each additional debt makes
it harder and harder for them to meet the
payments, and everything can break down
as soon as any new problem arises.
Find it difficult to get to the end of the
month (or might soon be in this situa-
tion, e.g. if their employment contract is
not extended, the interest rate on the
mortgage rises, they fall ill or get a
divorce, etc.).
Have no difficulty getting to the end of
the month and are not likely to have any
(at least in the short or medium term). If
serious unexpected problems arise, they
have the means (insurance, property, fa-
mily and social networks) to limit their
effects.
Do not have affective bonds and have
very few or no significant bonds.
Have bonds limited to a very small core
group of family members; relationships
are often stressed due to bad experiences
or economic or other difficulties.
Maintain more or less stable family bonds
and some friendships and relationships
with the community in their closest su-
rroundings; these are limited and difficult
to maintain due to lack of time. They do
not have significant relationships outside
their social surroundings
Have numerous, stable bonds on different
levels: both core and extended family,
friends, acquaintances and a wide social
network. Relationships adapt to changes
in family and professional life.
Do not have the right to vote. Politically
they are only useful (or “used”) as sca-
pegoats.
Do rarely or never; they have long igno-
red politics and do not know what their
rights are or what they can ask of the
government.
Follow politics with interest and nor-
mally vote, but do not have time to ke-
ep abreast of what is happening; when
they do, they do not have the necessary
information or contacts to enter the
system and assume a more active role.
Take part in politics via various points
of access; they know the system well
and have connections to enter it. They
are often part of a political organisation
and may even run for office.
14
The threshold of social exclusion is reached when different factors
generating exclusion are accumulated and reinforce each other.
Research shows that this process can take place quite quickly or last
for many years; that it can work both ways and that each person
can experience it differently, according to the particular
circumstances of his or her life (though in many cases the causes
and determining factors are similar). Therefore, there are reasons for
dealing with it, because exclusion is present and poses a threat, but
also reasons to hope, since few situations of exclusion are totally
“lost cases”: most of them can be improved. We must nevertheless
acknowledge that exclusion cannot be fought solely by the classical
tools of social policies (redistribution and universal public services);
it requires also more nuanced and place-based approaches.
Since 2007 a financial crisis unprecedented in the last
seventy-five years has significantly dragged down the growth
of the productive economy and led to the loss of millions of
jobs and a significant reduction in public income. While the
duration and intensity of the crisis have been different in
various parts of the world, it has unquestionably increased
the vulnerability of both, the economic bases of non wealthy
people and the democratic institutions whose responsibility is
to represent and protect society in times of need.
Crisis in the job market
According to International Labour Organisation’s data from
September 2010, thirty-four million people around the world
had lost their job since the beginning of the present
economic crisis; the biggest job losses had occurred in the
United States and Spain. Since 2007, numerous companies
had gone bankrupt and there had been other closures or
significant layoffs due to overproduction or relocation of
production to other countries. A large number of the self-
employed and small entrepreneurs, unable to manage such a
significant and lasting drop in profit, have quit. 
This situation has further intensified the segmentation of the
job market. Certain social groups —a minority in most
countries— enjoy stable, well-paid jobs and social protection,
while other, currently growing groups of people have —in the
best case— unstable and poorly-paid jobs which lack social
protection. Women, young people, immigrants and members
of ethnic minorities are clearly overrepresented in this second 
group, thus revealing the limitations of the meritocracy, in
which opportunities theoretically are within every individual’s
reach. Even in a meritocracy, two groups are missing: those
at the two ends of the spectrum. In the highest part of the
economic spectrum, a select, growing group of the very rich
lives off of the work of others; at the bottom, people in an
irregular situation are totally unprotected and seek to survive
by means of sporadic or irregular work, in some cases
resorting to criminal activities.
Given this, the only alternative that governments -exhausted
after making heavy use of Keynesian anti-cyclical stimuli- are
considering is to try to increase economic competitiveness
and open new markets abroad. In other words, we are seeing
an uncritical return to a model of strong economic growth.
However, with awareness of the planet’s biological and
physical limitations and of the resulting true costs of a model
based on unrestricted (and highly unequal) energy and
material consumption, the illusion of a market-based society
in which (almost) everyone could achieve a (reasonably) paid
job is disappearing.
Unless the rules are changed, in this reduced global playing
field it will become more and more difficult to base social
interaction on positive-sum games. The cruel reality of the
crisis is that it has presented us with zero-sum games (when
public budgets have to be balanced) or even with negative-
sum ones (such as when viable companies are closed in order
to achieve short-term financial benefit or when the
environment is abused to obtain a rather meagre short-term
profit).
Crisis in public power
Although States intervened in the initial phases of the crisis
by using their credit reserves in order to avoid the collapse of
markets and economic activity, after a short while those very
same States were facing a rather complicated situation with
regard to their finances, due to an explosive combination of
growing expenditures and falling income, often resulting in
two-digit public deficit rates.
This has affected the volume of public expenditure to a
greater or lesser degree, depending on the circumstances of
each country. Highly significant budget cuts have not
impacted the structure of the budget equally. Although
payments to public sector workers ended up being
considerably reduced, we might say that so far cutbacks have
particularly touched the programs and services that, though 
Bo1 1: Impacts of the global financial crisis on
exclusion
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not at the hard core of basic services, play an important role
in inclusion policies.
In many cases, local governments have been even more
affected by the crisis, seeing both their tax bases and state
and regional governments’ contributions reduced and having
little leeway to gain external sources of finance. Aside from
limiting investments, many town and city councils have had
to eliminate programs which worked to create thriving public
spaces, provide attention to diversity in schools and health
centres, support extracurricular education and education and
furnish economic aid to neighbourhood, cultural, sports and
youth activities12.
We might therefore say that the capacity of the State to
promote social inclusion (specifically in local governments)
has been reduced; and medium-term perspectives are not
good, considering the structural deficits many of these
administrations hold. The economic downturn and the tax and
budgetary reductions which came about as a result of it, are
another reason to consider change in inclusion policies. It
may not be the most important reason, but it is surely a
trigger that could set off changes.
Crisis in society
The crisis has also (sometimes brutally) revealed the fragility
of the financial situations of many families and social
projects. A slowing economy and resulting decreases in public
sector spending were enough to reveal the precariousness of
millions of people. Indeed, the flipside of the dynamism and
flexibility of globalized cities is precisely the extreme
vulnerability of many of the people living in them. Dynamic
cities in the globalized world are beset by constant flows of
new people in search of opportunities, people who often had
to leave behind their belongings, their roots and the support
networks provided by their families and friends.
Since these vulnerable “urbanites” do not bring their own
(economic, family/social, and political) capital with them,
they have to trust their luck and hope that they will obtain a
continuous flow of income —earned on their own, or working
for businesses, or provided to them by the state— which
allows them to continue to pay for food, housing and other
basic services. If this fails, they maintain their income by
finding irregular income sources (undeclared work) or even by
resorting to crime. It is not unusual for families to combine
two or three regular and irregular sources of income. However, 
what is surprising is that the public is apparently (or
supposedly) shocked to discover the increase in the number
of thefts and robberies three years after the start of the
crisis, despite the insufficient levels of social protection
which have been provided.
In terms of the majority of the middle class, whose means of
living is not in danger, at least at the moment, the crisis has
led to an increasing fear that they might lose a status which
was taken for granted, fear that they might not be able to
ensure their future well-being, for themselves and their
children. The extreme “status anxiety” (de Botton, 2004) in
certain social circles is certainly related to one of the key
principles of globalisation: winner takes all (salaries, rewards,
public image, etc.), which is a good thing for the system,
since there can be no better stimulus than this for
competitiveness. We find this phenomenon repeated in
culture, sport and other social arenas, and in addition to
focusing lives on a kind of ruthless, unceasing competition, it
compounds the rejection of everything that is considered
“inferior”, because it doesn’t meet the required standards. In
other words, winner takes all works like a “massive weapon of
exclusion” which acts through ignorance and belittling.
Can the crisis be an opportunity?
Every crisis, including the current one, brings with it the
potential for positive change. Systemic pathologies are not
always obvious to the majority of the population until their
effects break out virulently. We now see that the crisis has
caused a rapid increase in situations of exclusion, but we
know that the system was already strongly exclusive before
the financial bubble burst. Growth experienced by Spain in
the long prodigious decade between 1995-2007 shepherded in
an unprecedented intensification of the commoditisation of
society, since the mirage in which many lived made them
think that everything was possible with money and that there
always would be money for everything and for almost
everyone; that is, for everyone apart from an unavoidable,
small group of excluded people.
The sudden shock with the economic, ecological and social
limits of reality present an opportunity to de-commoditise
part of our lives and recover time and spaces in order to
generate new solidarities and mobilisations, which favour a
12 Paulais’ (pp. 10-12) description of this point is particularly illustrative.
16
stronger and more sustainable society in all respects.
Nevertheless, we also see an increase in the risk of selfish
deviations, of closures and violent regressions in the face of
the inevitability of change. Politics, that is, democratic
politics based on dialogue, is now more important than ever,
precisely at a point when it has suffered a strong loss of
prestige.
If our intention is to climb out of this rut, it will be
necessary to conceive and put into practice new, more
inclusive forms of producing goods and services, able to
generate both, social protection and bonds between people.
2.2 The dimensions of inclusion
Social inclusion is a concept at least as complex and
multidimensional as the exclusion it intends to solve. We have
identified five dimensions of inclusion, which are directly related to
five basic human needs: occupation, protection, recognition, bonds
and participation. We explore these concepts in the following
sections.
2.2.1 Inclusion as occupation
In the immense majority of countries, paid work is the entrance
door to essential resources that people need to become full
members of society: stable income provides them with social
protection and status, and allows them to afford primary goods
and to set up in their own homes. Beyond providing the
resources necessary for living, paid work gives people such
essential things as the ability to refine and develop their own
abilities, significant social bonds, self-esteem and a sense of
personal dignity: individuals become responsible for themselves
and jointly responsible for the society in which they live, a
society to which they contribute with their taxes. The effects of
unemployment on people, widely studied and described, include
progressive loss of skills, of social contacts, of motivation and of
self-esteem, thus having a very high risk of suffering from
depression (Sen, 2000).
We can, however, talk about occupation in a broader sense, in terms
of tasks that are meaningful, useful, or bring social recognition,
tasks which can be developed outside the job market and within the
family, group or community. This kind of occupation can provide the
same benefits as paid work, but an essential factor, access to
income, is missing. Therefore, the third sector's capacity to generate
attractive activities which enhance inclusion will largely depend on
the existence of alternative paths to provide people a subsistence
income, alternatives which can hardly be possible without some
form or other of government intervention.
2.2.2 Inclusion as protection
Protection, in the sense of insurance, is an essential value for
people's well-being and largely drives us to live in society. We join
together to better protect our physical and mental integrity, and
when this protection functions reasonably we feel part of the group
and trust in it. The very concept of “social insurance” indicates the
essence of what has become an inherent feature in contemporary
advanced societies.
On this point, we therefore talk about access to resources (via
income transfers) and public services (health, social services,
insurance, etc.) that guarantee people a certain protection from
largely unavoidable adversities. These include accidents, epidemics
and crime, which can affect health and assets, as well as illness,
accidents, forced unemployment and ageing, which can lead to a
sudden or gradual loss of self-sustenance. We also talk about
promoting public health and providing health services which are
accessible to the whole of the population.
Social protection mechanisms have another equally important
purpose: they reduce income and wealth inequalities generated by
the unequal distribution of abilities among people and by the very
logic of the capitalist economic system. It is well known that when a
society does not have any social policies, a large number of people
are forced to live on the fringe, fighting to survive in an unhealthy,
miserable environment, using all legal or illegal means available to
them. In this regard, the correlation between social inequality and
criminality is obvious. 
2.2.3 Inclusion as recognition
In contemporary societies, diversity has grown constantly for
decades. This is due not only to the exponential increase in
residential mobility which brings people from highly diverse
ethnic groups, nationalities and language backgrounds into
contact but also to the diversification of options in religion,
politics, sex, food and other key aspects of life, as a result of an
individualisation process which has broken down in many
countries the barriers on freedom of conscience and choice.
Finally we need to talk as well about diversities that are not the
result of choice, but rather misfortune, such as those caused by
growing economic and social inequalities and physical or mental
disability. On the whole, we could say that the homogenous
societies that fed the imagination of Nation States no longer
exist.
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Diversity simply reflects the enormous wealth and complexity of
human life. It can be seen as an inexhaustible reserve of knowledge
and experience, but also can be used for different economic, social
or political purposes. It is commonplace, for example, for diversity
to serve as a pretext to justify unequal treatment between persons
or the direct exclusion of certain persons from access to places,
goods or services that are considered valuable. These practices,
which we call discrimination, have numerous personal and social
costs. What is at risk here is not only equal opportunities, but also
the person's sense of dignity, which is fundamental for everyone to
feel and act as a full member of the community. Sennet (2003) has
convincingly presented the relationship between the respect that
society is capable of showing towards its weakest members and the
capacity of these to overcome their difficulties and keep developing.
Societies have certainly shown an ability to adapt to changing
realities, which has led to general progress towards recognition of
diversity and non-discrimination. However, there is still a long way
to go and we cannot afford to fall back in any way, unless we want
to accept a large amount of pain and exclusion.
2.2.4 Inclusion as education
Forming part of a society means having at least a basic knowledge
of its codes of communication and the necessary information needed
to be satisfactorily placed in those spheres of life that can satisfy
the biological and psychological needs of each individual13. The
process of socialisation basically consists of passing on and/or
acquiring everything that the adult generations consider necessary
for life. This starts within the family when we are born, and
continues mainly but much less exclusively in those institutions
created specifically to educate. As societies become more open,
dynamic, complex and technologically-oriented, the educational
requirements which are necessary to become and remain a part of
productive society grow and diversify; consequently, young peoples’
education takes longer and becomes more costly, and ongoing
lifelong education is no longer an option but rather a need. In this
sense, the case of new information and communication technologies
is paradigmatic.
This is why we can say that, in present societies, inclusion is at
stake principally in the scenarios of knowledge and value
transmission. What are these scenarios and how do they look like?
Are they formal or informal, public or private, prestigious or non-
prestigious, integrative or segregated, free or inaccessible to those
with modest incomes? In short, are they appropriate or inappropriate
methods of giving everyone a real chance to receive the skills to live
and develop autonomously in society? Given the size of the
challenge, we may agree that an inclusive society requires many
different kinds of educational scenarios, but that all of them must
include a common educational core which guarantees our ability to
universally pass on an essential set of shared codes and values.
2.2.5 Inclusion as bonding
Human beings are social beings. In addition to the fact that human
children need a prolonged period of care in order to be able to
survive, it is simply not possible for someone who is completely
isolated to build a truly human life.
Both quantity and quality of social connections and networks are
positively correlated with levels of income, education and well-
being. In addition to allowing us to share resources and supports
which make life safer and richer, social relations provide an
essential good called information; above all, they contribute
practical information that is useful in the many different areas of
life in society.
Although this appears to be the least political dimension of all,
social bonds are of enormous importance. The American political
scientist Robert Putnam (Putnam, 2002), demonstrated that
relations forged with people beyond the family constitute valuable
social capital which, generating and strengthening the strategic
value trust, enable economies and governments to function
smoothly.
2.2.6 Inclusion as participation
To talk about inclusion as participation is in fact another way of
formulating our research question. Participation is qualitatively
different from the other four dimensions we have considered;
indeed, politics’ stated goal is shaping social life through the
discourse and the action of social actors. Participation gives
individuals the chance to do something really meaningful and can
create very powerful bonds; through participation one can fight
against discrimination, or for the improvement of public services or
for better working conditions. This is why, as we shall see, many
thinkers have considered inclusion to be an essentially political
phenomenon.
When we talk about participation, we do not limit its meaning to
voting or running for office, being active in a political party, or
13 Certainly, two or more almost parallel communities with different languages and
cultural practices can exist in the same place and be connected only through the
political community; that is, a shared State. In such cases, the game of inclusion is
played on two, relatively independent levels: inclusion in the community
(ethnic/cultural) and inclusion in society (political), in which formal and informal
education plays an essential role.
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taking part in areas of deliberative or direct democracy such as
government boards or councils, public debates and public opinion
surveys. These are all essential aspects of participation, but should
not overshadow other actions, such as actively taking part in
organisations or groups that generate public value when defending
certain causes, putting on public events, or supporting groups in
need, to give a few examples. We are convinced that all of these
latter factors have, to a greater or lesser extent, a political impact,
too.
Ultimately, we are talking about citizenship, of a dynamic concept
of citizenship, founded on the values of equal opportunities,
solidarity, democracy and personal autonomy. It is a citizenship that
can only grow and be consolidated through its own exercise; it
cannot longer be a simple receptacle or container of recognised
rights, but must become a permanent exercise of joint responsibility
and solidarity in the face of shared problems.
Nowadays, at a time when the discourse of denigration or outright
rejection of politics has gained an undeniable strength in different
layers of society, it becomes difficult to give any plausibility to the
idea of participation as an essential requirement of citizenship and
the basis for “everything else” (e.g. freedoms, services, cohesion,
etc.). Nevertheless, we intuitively assume that participation within
society is positively correlated with the quality of its democratic
system and levels of social inclusion.
2.3 Contradictions and weaknesses in the
discourse of inclusion
As already stated, the paradigm of inclusion has been assumed by
a large portion of the academic community and has been included
in the political discourse of both, parties and institutions.
Apparently, the theory of social inclusion has sufficient
explanatory and prescriptive force to be considered a new
paradigm for social policy making. However, since the 1990s the
notion of social exclusion has remained highly ambiguous,
displaying different meanings depending on the academic
discipline from which it is approached and the ideological
currents and cultural and institutional contexts from which it is
applied. Social inclusion has apparently been fostered from a wide
range of political projects, some of which were even in open
conflict with each other. Therefore we must consider numerous
doubts and clarify some suspicions before deciding to assume (or
not assume) that inclusion is a valid paradigm for progressive
21st-century urban societies. Specifically, we need to figure out if
and to what extent the paradigm of inclusion is economically
biased, culturally homogenising, socially stigmatising and
politically irrelevant.
2.3.1 Economically biased?
There is a very influential strand of thought, endorsed by the most
powerful political and economic institutions of the world that
considers the paradigm of inclusion basically from an economic
point of view. According to this approach, in a commoditised world
the only people who are seen as included are those who have a
certain economic independence, since not only the degree of
consumption a person can afford depends on this, but also other
essential elements such as their sense of dignity and personal value.
Without these endowments it is impossible to be on an equal
footing to act in society. And in the adult phase of life, only
income from jobs or from property rents can finance economic
independence. For the immense majority of the population,
inclusion therefore requires effective integration into the job
market. Those who are not integrated into the job market inevitably
find themselves on the path to exclusion.
While we agree that employment holds a core position in the
process of social inclusion, we also believe that all views focused
exclusively on work and income fail when the model includes very
real phenomena such as:
• Unpaid work: A large part of the population is engaged in unpaid
work, particularly reproductive work. This should be seen, at all
effects, as work even though it is not recognised or
compensated. If economic independence is a sine qua non
condition for inclusion, shouldn’t we consider as “excluded” all
people who receive their income through partners, relatives or
friends?
• Precarious, poorly paid work (the so-called working poor): The
existence of this class of work makes possible that a person,
though fully integrated into the formal economy, can be excluded
for all practical effects when subject to precarious conditions and
low salaries which do not cover her basic needs. On this point it
is worth asking what is worse for a person, to be excluded from
the labour market (bearing in mind all of the consequences that
come along with this) or included but in a very unfavourable job
market, doing precarious and poorly paid work, devoid of social
recognition? Everyone facing precarious working conditions
considers this question, and many may conclude that under
certain conditions it is better to give up a formal job and
instead elect to receive (financial) support from the government
or to do informal work and/or pursue criminal paths14. 
• Unemployment as a structural phenomenon: This is typical in a
world characterised by highly technical industrial and agricultural
14 See Jordan.
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production, where creating new quality jobs requires constantly
increasingly levels of investment and education. In the post-
Fordist economy, if a person fails to be included on an
educational level, we cannot expect high levels of inclusion in
the job market.
To sum up, if in times of economic bonanza the strategy based on
(full) occupation runs short, it does so still more in times of crisis.
Under such conditions, associating human dignity and happiness
exclusively with employment and consumption seems to us to be at
least irresponsible and more likely a purposeful tactic adopted by
public and private institutions that control the bulk of the world’s
economy and have an objective interest in keeping the price of the
workforce down. Indeed, for 30 or 40 years, these dominant social
groups have pushed to condemn unemployment on a moral level and
encourage workfare policies at any price, without bearing in mind
the opportunity cost of other socially useful options, such as taking
care of the family, being involved in the community or pursuing
artistic endeavours.
We agree that the most important dimension of inclusion is the
economic one, but we arrive to this point of view from rather
different premises. For us, the key factor is not access to the job
market but rather the levels of unequal distribution of wealth that
the logic underlying the job market can generate. We accept that a
certain level of economic inequality is an inevitable result of the
unequal distribution of human abilities, but we must be aware that
the structure, degree, and consequences of economic inequalities
vary significantly between countries. On this point, it is important
to realise that there is a clear relationship between economic
inequality and social exclusion, which has been demonstrated
empirically in numerous studies15. In the market societies of the
globalized world, inclusion inevitably needs the correction of
economic inequalities, and even more of the impact of these
inequalities on the non-economic spheres of society16. We believe it
is essential to bear this in mind in order to develop suitable
policies.
2.3.2 Promoting social homogeneity and conformism?
As Rosetti points out (Rosetti, 2007:31), we still have not resolved
the discussion around “what the counter-concept to exclusion is”.
The problem is not that there are various possible names for it (in
addition to inclusion, other terms frequently used to refer to the
concept are integration, insertion, and cohesion) but rather that we
have not reached any agreement on the meaning(s) of the concept.
These range from fully accepting the idea of the dominant class’
cultural superstructure without criticism (to put it in Marxist terms)
to understanding it as equal access to rights and duties, beyond
ethnic, cultural, economic and other possible differences.
Nevertheless, the most common view is that societies formulate
ideals of inclusion based on very specific cultural traits. Though
there are many diverse ways of living in different parts of the world,
in modern societies the predominant ideal is based on the levels of
consumption that one is capable of financing, whether material or
immaterial (i.e. relationships, experiences, culture, etc.); definitely
more important than, e.g., levels of social commitment and
participation. This is the perfect reflection of a society based on the
market, one which tends to look down on any living situation which
deviates from the standard, in which a happily-included person or
family has a (well) paid job (at least for the man of the household),
owns a house, and consumes a significant amount of goods and
services. The exception to this model is the outstanding icons of
culture, art or sports, which are nevertheless expected to deviate in
very specific ways.
There is therefore a tendency to call certain situations “exclusion”
problems when they simply reflect different ways of understanding
life. Although in recent decades most countries have broadened
their concepts of what is socially admissible –and, to a certain
extent, of what should be considered “normal”- there is still an
excessive tendency to seek homogeneity. We often reject people and
groups who are too different; if we see that they cannot achieve
what we believe to be a “worthy” standard of living, we tend to
think that they have to be helped. Often, however, this situation is
less about helping a supposedly excluded person than reaffirming
the status of the mainstream groups, which need confirmation that
their way of living is the only valid one and that the privileges
which come along with it are justified.
Yet people are diverse and the societies shaped by them even more
so; they could be characterized by an ever-growing, unredeemable
diversity. Basing our idea of inclusion on a highly constricted ideal
of life, unavoidably leads to a poor understanding of social problems
and to “solutions” that shoot down any and all initiatives that are
not suitably conventional. Indeed, if you fall outside the standard
model of what a citizen should be, you are more likely to be viewed
with the stigma that society reserves for excluded people, a stigma
directly associated with poverty in the broadest sense of the term
and linked to marginality, desperation and failure. 
Viewing exclusion as a heavily and negatively connoted term serves
those in power in two ways: on the one hand it reinforces the
attractive standard model of inclusion (which, in contrast to the
stigmatised individuals, is seen as the only desirable and true
15 Judt (pp. 29-31.) In light of the links between economic inequality and criminality,
morbidity and other social pathologies, Judt considers inequality to be a corrosive
phenomenon of societies.
16 See Michael Walzer (1983) for a brilliant discussion of this topic. 
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model) and on the other hand it makes easier to subject
individuals and groups established outside the norm (e.g. illegal
immigrants, drug addicts, the homeless, prostitutes, etc.) to
societal mechanisms of control. If we non-critically assign stigma,
putting someone in the socially-excluded category allows us to see
them as existing not in ours but in another world, the world of
incomplete and incompetent human beings. As such, those
individuals are assumed to be unable to participate as full members
of the community and are seen as individuals who need to be
protected.
Even when trying to help those who are in need, stigmatisation is
so interiorised that it is usually unconscious. We must realise that
this way of viewing the problem, this "well-meant stigmatisation”
often hides deep rooted paternalism. When strong enough,
paternalism can prevent the disadvantaged people across society
from improving their situation via their own means, by trying routes
which may be different but which could be equally valid. Pressure
by the happily-included majority to assimilate minorities is exerted
at the individual, group, and community levels. This suggests a
tendency to search for solutions (inclusion policies) that are too
homogenous and do not sufficiently consider the importance of the
local context: the concrete, nearby space where the processes of
exclusion and inclusion play out and develop every day.
As seen above, although the inclusion paradigm considers and
values the local dimension, public powers have not borne it
sufficiently in mind when formulating directives or action plans.
There is still a very strong tendency to conceive social and political
reality from the perspective of homogenous, closed categories.
Governments which hold on to the classical concept of nation-state
and the principle of national solidarity which results of it, have in
many cases given precedence to state action plans; there has been
no significant transfer of resources to regional and especially local
entities. Furthermore, countries which do not sufficiently recognise
internal plurality have insisted that individuals must adopt the
linguistic and cultural traits of the country’s majority group in
order to be included in society. These approaches ignore the fact
that, beside and beyond the narrow cultural dimension, local
contexts are often distinctive because of other things, such as the
biological and geographical traits (e.g. climate, landscape,
resources), the economic base and the types of things people do to
earn a living.
Individuals and communities react in the same way when they are
not recognised as equal players and granted the possibility to make
their own choices in life. Either they challenge the legitimacy of the
system or, the more often, they opt for conformity, which results in
a more or less devalued version of the standard model, apathy, and
stagnation.
2.3.3 Politically unaware and irrelevant?
The discourse of inclusion has been strongly criticised by
classical sociology, and especially by the so-called British class
sociology, which questions two of its essential assumptions: 1.
That individualisation and the overcoming of national frameworks
are  key factors of the current social transformation (because
these issues tend only to concern certain minorities, normally
mostly composed of well-to-do individuals) and 2. That class
analysis has lost the capacity to fully explain inequalities
between people. In accordance with this view, we are not facing
a new era but rather updated versions of old inequalities and
class conflicts. Indeed, in the most extreme version of this
criticism, the defenders of the inclusion paradigm are accused of
hiding, or at least minimising, the importance of class conflicts
and of thus contributing to the process of deideologisation and
of degradation of politics to simple management of a series of
“inevitable” changes (e.g. the approach taken by the so-called
“Third Way”; see Atkinson, 2007). Ulrich Beck, a conspicuous
representative of the new approach, contested these accusations
by saying that in no case did he deny the existence of
inequalities (which he sees, indeed, becoming more exacerbated
over time); rather, he states that neither the genesis nor the
structure of inequalities could be explained primarily in terms of
class (Beck, 2007).
On an institutional level, however, it is true that inclusion
became fully visible in European and state policies under the so-
called Lisbon Agenda, which basically reflected European state's
desire to be the leading players in liberal globalisation and
considered social inclusion from the perspective of ”helping
those who are unable to keep following (...)” the only valid,
viable model. In no case did this represent either recognition of
the social consequences of economic liberalisation or a possible
correction of structural inequalities.
On the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, the
political insensitivity of the exclusion/inclusion dialectics has
been linked to its holistic ambition; that is, to the tendency to
group all existing situations of inequality and social conflict
together under the exclusion paradigm. The problem with this,
according to Iris M. Young, is that by doing so the concepts of
exclusion and inclusion lose their meaning and are no longer
useful in terms of critical analysis. In this vein, Young (Young,
2002) believes we should “call a spade a spade”, and if the
problems are racism, cultural intolerance, economic exploitation
or the refusal to help people, we should name them so. In fact,
both Young and Robert Dahl (Dahl, 2000) believe that inclusion
is a concept which belongs essentially to the sphere of politics.
According to them, we talk about (political) exclusion when
21
certain people or groups are excluded from the decision-making
processes that affect them; this has obvious economic and social
consequences which can be seen in poverty, few job
opportunities, and other similar issues. Not only does this line of
argument join democracy and inclusion, it considers them
inseparable. To talk about “inclusive democracy” would therefore
be a pleonasm, since a democratic society must be inherently
inclusive in order to be truly democratic.
The allegation of political insensitivity and ineffectiveness is
probably the most radical objection being put against the social
inclusion theory. Does the exclusion/inclusion paradigm help to
hide subjects which were and are still essential —such as
inequality, class conflict or poverty— from the political debate
and put them off the political agenda? According to this critical
vision, the ideal of inclusion does nothing more than express the
desire to overcome deep social conflicts, based on the unfair
distribution of economic and political power, without privileged
groups having to assume their due share.
Along this promising critical strain, a concept appears that has
been used as a guideline for the inclusion policies from a strictly
liberal view of social exclusion, that of “equal opportunities”.
Equal opportunities are not only put forward as a way to resolve
exclusion, with the meritocratic principle used as a basic
criterion for distributing goods and honours in society, but also
as a solution to equity and justice. If people have the same
chances of developing professionally, thus acquiring a high
status and being fully “included” in society, then the successful
ones can be satisfied at their, fully legitimate, success. For their
part, losers have to accept their fate because they have not
managed to use properly their energy, their skills and other
resources, and have thus failed to seize the opportunities that
society offered them.
But to what extent can everyone be offered the same
opportunities? Can a starting point under equal conditions
realistically be considered, when we thing about the widely
differing endowments (physical and intellectual) and the capital
(economic and cultural) that, respectively, nature and society
make available to each individual? Obviously not, because there
are many factors that produce inequality and render the ideal of
equal opportunities impossible; some are derived from genetics,
some from sheer hazard (good or bad luck). Nevertheless,
another, the most substantial part of inequality stems from the
social organisation itself.
The fact of a more heterogeneous, fragmented society and
individualised life courses does not mean that there are no
common, socially constructed processes that strongly condition
individual lives. We find the clearest example of this in the fact
that the socio-economic position of the parents is still the
strongest factor in predicting the position that the children will
have, and in some countries, such as the United States of
America and the United Kingdom, social mobility has even
decreased in the last three decades (Judt, 2010:27). Examples of
other social phenomena associated with exclusion and highly
frequent in post-industrial societies are immigrant discrimination
(especially irregular immigrants), mental illnesses amongst the
younger population, gender violence and increased work
instability.
When many people experience the same phenomenon, and this
grows and becomes frequent, there must be social causes behind
it that have to be ascertained and analysed, and the possible
political implications must also be considered. The enormous
inequalities of world income and wealth are “...more than just
bad luck or a certain combination of preferences, tastes, skills and
personal effort” (Puyol, 2010:205).
People's attitude and behaviour are obviously important too;
some individuals learn to know how to chance the system and
move from a precarious start towards inclusion, other exceptional
individuals even manage to reach the top of the social status.
Nevertheless, no matter how spectacular these cases are, they
are still the exceptions that confirm the rule repeatedly
confirmed by the statistics: if the only thing we can offer is a
weak view of equal opportunities, incapable of guaranteeing
consistent redistribution policies, many people, the vast majority
in the most discriminated groups, will fail to attain a decent
quality of life, no matter how hard they try.
In the end, social inclusion shouldn’t be devised as a supposedly
fair individual race to sort out the capable, but rather as an ideal
of universally validity, with a reasonable chance of everyone, or
nearly everyone, being able to achieve it. From this perspective
it does not seem possible to achieve significant progress in
combating exclusion without “...unmasking the way in which the
institutions and social relations are structured in order to restrict
some people’s opportunities for developing and exercising their
skills and achieving their goals” (Puyol, 2010:203); unmasking in
order to change them for something better.
The following table shows a series of paradigms that have tried
to explain exclusion. They differ in the causes of exclusion, in its
consequences and, logically, in the policy recommendations to
fight against it. We can also see that each paradigm considers a
certain correspondence and fits one form of democracy. This will
be analysed in depth in the next chapter.
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The four paradigms or views of the problem of exclusion compete
with each other in both the academic and the political area, Some
scholars and politicians are totally convinced about the superiority
of their respective paradigms, but others express more doubts on
the fact that there might be one paradigm clearly superior to the
others, which might therefore become the general rule in inclusion
policies. Facing such a complex phenomenon, simple explanations
are not compelling enough. If we are to achieve better analysis and
better responses, social science should devote more effort to
researching exclusion and inclusion from a multidisciplinary
approach (sociology, political science, economics, law,
anthropology,...); an approach that takes in account both the
theoretical (descriptive-explanatory) and the practical (regulatory-
prescriptive) side of knowledge, and is able to apply it from a
specifically local perspective (case studies, local observatories of
exclusion). 
2.4 For a complex, relational and dynamic
view of inclusion
Though it is possible to make poor use of the paradigm of
inclusion as rhetoric to conceal inequalities and social conflicts,
there are undeniable signs of change, which point to the
pervasiveness of the exclusion/inclusion logic. The most obvious
sign of it is the growing segmentation and segregation in work,
housing, school, sport and other social domains. Individualisation
also seems to be clearly coupled with greater vulnerability,
because people now can count less on the family and community
cushions that were previously available, and the Welfare State,
which could compensate this loss, has stagnated or even tended
to halter. There is also a broad agreement on the characterisation
of social exclusion as a dynamic, multidimensional and
heterogeneous phenomenon, that we may find in different stages
and situations (from vulnerability to extreme exclusion) through
which individuals of any class and condition can pass, depending
on a wide variety of factors. Exclusion is a process that in
principle could affect everyone, although to very different
degrees, and which is not irreversible. The indeterminacy and
plasticity of social exclusion make inclusion policies purposeful
and necessary.
Nevertheless, the criticisms presented in the previous point force
us to refine the concepts much better, to guarantee that the
paradigm of social inclusion, and the policies derived from it, will
be tools at the service of social progress. Work is needed on four
very specific points: reaffirming multidimensionality, assuming
diversity, building the social problem and foreseeing collective
action. We will see that, from this perspective, autonomy is the
word that best reflects the ideal of social inclusion.
Table 2: Paradigms explaining social exclusion
Paradigm Causes of exclusion Responses to Social model Public policy Political field 
exclusion model defending it
Individual
attitudes
Social
disconnection
Social
inequalities
Exploitation
and domination
Adapted from:
Rosetti (p. 36).
Misuse of market
opportunities and wrong
public interventions
Breakage and weakening
of social bonds
Monopoly and
concentration of economic
and political power
Capitalist and patriarchal
inequalities. New labour
“reserve army”
Individualism:
effort and
motivation
Solidarity and
cohesion
Redistribution
and equality
Social
transformation
Market model
Social
integration
Political and
social rights
Equality in an
alternative
social model
Workfare policies;
occupational
deregulation
Active inclusion
policies
Welfare
redistributing
policies
Policies of
emancipation and
empowering actions
Neo-conservatism
and neo-liberalism
(Anglo-Saxon)
Republicanism
(French)
Classical social
democracy
New radical
perspectives
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2.4.1 Inclusion is always multidimensional 
Both the essentially disciplinary organisation of scientific
knowledge production and the essentially vertically divided
structure of public administration tend to strongly fragment the
problem of exclusion, while consciously or unconsciously forgetting
that the very concept of exclusion was generated from
multidisciplinary and transversal approaches, because this was the
only way to understand the complex interrelationships between the
different factors involved. There are therefore some who deal with
the problem in strictly economic terms, as we have already seen,
but others who do so in strictly political, or social, or cultural
terms. The single dimensional approaches tell us that inclusion is
only a matter of money, or political power, or interpersonal
relationships, or values...
To be coherent with the theoretical and conceptual framework of
inclusion, we should not get carried away by this kind of
discourses, no matter how well they might be grounded in their
speciality. We should think and work in an interdisciplinary way,
although it may be slower and more complicated, because this is
the only effective way to approach and deal with the problem. The
interdisciplinary focus implies more intervention and coordination
costs, because it is necessary to advance on all fronts at the same
time. However, the positive side of it is that individuals and
society can be more resilient, because all factors are
interconnected but none of them is, by itself, truly essential to
achieve an acceptable level of inclusion.
To put an example related to the economic dimension: although
poverty is considered to be one of the most determining factors of
exclusion, we can think of cases in which the correlation poverty-
exclusion is not that evident. We refer to people who, while in a
state of objective material poverty, take a full part in the life of
their families and communities, regardless of whether they are
workers with low salaries, unemployed or pensioners. At the other
end of the economic scale, there are also people in a relatively
comfortable economic and financial situation but who are immersed
in situations of exclusion due to failing health or to a lack of
family and social networks. The material factor is important, but
there are other factors which play a role.
Other plausible situations, well known from many non-democratic
regimes, are people suffering severe political exclusion, but who
can compensate it with powerful group and community solidarity
networks. Even considering extreme situations, such as
imprisonment, it that does not have to mean, necessarily and
automatically, that the affected person falls into social exclusion,
because it is just a factor, although a very negative one, in a life
path within the inclusion-exclusion continuum.
2.4.2 Inclusion is essentially autonomy 
When we start thinking of a form of social inclusion that neither
segregates nor assimilates or annihilates individual initiative,
which is capable of accommodating diversity while enabling life in
a shared social space, we come to the concept of autonomy; that
is the person's capacity to develop her own life project, according
to her desires and possibilities and cooperating on an equal
footing with other members of society.
Autonomy is a highly demanding ideal that implies assuming three
old principles that still hold in drawing out a horizon of human
emancipation:
1. Freedom of being and acting in accordance on one's own
conscience. Individuals and groups acting autonomously can and
do produce different, often unexpected, results. There are
different ways to integrate in working life, to form a family, to
democratically govern a community, etc. which are the fruit of
specific cultural conditions and other different factors. All of the
life options that respect certain essential moral principles (non-
violence, non-aggression non-discrimination...) are legitimate
and, as such, must be accepted even though their social value
might be the object of criticism.
2. Equality, that means we assume that the life of each and every
one of the people is equally important and deserves an identical
moral status. Society must be committed to the emancipation (or
empowerment) “of the disadvantaged classes until a society is
achieved in which the only legitimate differences are those which
reflect different, free, morally legitimate forms of understanding
life” (Puyol, 2010:208).
3. Fraternity, expressed in cooperation and solidarity. Living in
society, and still more in our high-density, highly complex urban
societies, life projects can only be developed openly and in
collaboration. This logic of cooperation can and must occur in the
different spheres of life (home, market, state...), each with criteria
of rationality and specific norms and behaviours. The cities’ origin
lies in human beings’ search for a better life by exchanging
particularly goods and services (market), but also ideas (forum).
The model requires the three principles, but there is an underlying
tension between them that must be made productive by seeking a
suitable balance point, especially between freedom and equality,
because freedom does not consider the collective dimension and
equality doesn’t take into account the individual dimension of the
person. The principle of fraternity, which in a paradigm based on
autonomy should be understood more as cooperation than solidarity,
provides the necessary link between individual and community, an
essential link to guarantee constant critical dialogue, adaptation and
agreement between autonomous life projects, without which social
progress, and not even life in common, would be possible.
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Rejecting a model of inclusion based on paternalism does not force
us to the other extreme, to the assumption that any option chosen
autonomously will, for this sole reason, necessarily be good17. If the
emblem of the first modernity was criticism of the traditional order,
the emblem of the second modernity is “criticism of criticism” (Beck,
2007); all models and all projects, albeit traditional or progressive,
from below or above, must pass through the same critical filter and
have their validity pretension tested. Above all, criticism –systematic
and constructive- should be seen as a way to connect and engage
individuals in an exchange of views and arguments through which
intellectual and social capital may be generated.
Because we know that inclusion through autonomy is dynamic, but
also eminently relational. Everyone is invited to take part in society,
because everyone is able to contribute, but no one can do entirely
without the others. The more complex the societies, the more they
depend on relationship and exchange for their economic, social and
cultural progress.
The ideal of autonomy should be normative in all areas of life,
starting with the home and family relationships and continuing with
social groups, companies and institutions. It should also be
normative in the territorial political organisation, from the local
communities to a hypothetical and ever more necessary world
government. The federal principle or the principle of subsidiarity
also seems the most valid answer to us in accommodating people’s
wish to be them in an ever more complex, interdependent world.
17 Cleaver (1999:605) wonders whether the fear of being labelled paternalists will
repress any kind of criticism of the options and actions of the most vulnerable groups
in the end. Here he sees the danger of “swinging from one untenable position (“we
know best”) to an equally untenable and damaging one (“they know best”)”.
In a plural and diversity friendly society, the routes to
inclusion must be open, flexible and inevitably local. In other
words, each place, which might be the district, the village or
the city, has its specific biophysical, demographic, economic
and social cultural conditioners, and also a singular
constellation of needs. For exclusion and inclusion materialise
basically in proximity, in the structures and processes which
shape and give meaning to people’s daily life. This local level
has to enjoy proper self-government if it is to articulate
collective action against inclusion.
It is not by chance that political-administrative
decentralisation, mostly expressed in the existence of
democratic local governments, is associated with an increase
in institutional quality and human development. Institutions
such as the United Nations and especially the Council of
Europe have noted this demand and have put resources into
its normative and technical development.
Note: Inclusion and Local Autonomy
Local autonomy has also been criticised, due to the scarcity
of critical mass and essential resources that many local
governments may deploy when addressing big problems. It is
also accused of provoking the dispersion of political power,
resulting in a State's overall smaller capacity to redistribute
income and correct inequalities. Undoubtedly local
governments may be even more inefficient and ineffective as
their regional and national counterparts, and the claim for
local autonomy can also encourage or cover sheer egoism,
such as when well-to-do districts attempt (and often succeed)
to separate from their core cities and become municipalities
by themselves, in order to avoid resources being redistributed
to the poorer districts through taxes.
However, these problems are not resolved with less local
autonomy, but rather with better institutional designs and
regulations. High levels of transparency and accountability
are required, as well as suitable metropolitan institutions to
guarantee both the institutional output and the redistribution
policies. This makes necessary that the (traditional) local
identity and/or residents’ political will cease to be considered
the only factors in drawing up the map of local institutions.
It is also important to apply a systemic -regional and
national- vision, of the territory; one that reflects the true
dynamics of urban economies and societies, where we find a
growing mixture of people of different origins, professions
and status. It must be clear, however, that once the map and
the general framework have been drawn up, national
governments should respect the democratic will of each local
government in exercising its competencies.
In the countries with more powerful, consolidated local
autonomy, local power is often built around a relatively small
number of municipalities, with a certain critical mass of
population and resources, and well provided with
competencies and fiscal income. Nonetheless, the correct
functioning of local autonomy doesn’t have to imply the
suppression of small municipalities. There are other
institutional arrangements that allow a circumstantial
(associations, consortia...) or stable (supra-municipal entities
such as local regions, cantons, provinces...) expression of
cooperation between municipalities. Nonetheless, local
governments should have sufficient autonomy and resources
to plan and develop their own inclusion policies.
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2.4.3 Inclusion is a social and political question
By definition, social exclusion is neither static nor irreversible; if we
consider inclusion as a problem caused by society, and which
society itself must address, the question that comes next is that of
collective action; that is, of politics. Historically, the disadvantaged
and excluded social groups have mobilised in some way or other in
response to injustice to improve their situation with a wide range of
strategies (protest, resistance, revolution, union, political party...),
conditioned by many factors, such as the shape of the production
structure, the existence of a powerful alternative ideology and of
charismatic leaderships, the possibility of establishing alliances with
other social groups, or the openness of institutions. The results of
such mobilisations have been unequal, with responses that range
from beneficence systems to legally regulated social protection,
from group and inter-group solidarity to the recognition and
inclusion of the groups oppressed by the social mainstream and the
State, from progressive social reform to revolutionary rupture.
However, despite recurrent fallbacks the overall trend moves towards
greater inclusion.
Today, nothing is essentially different in this point. The fight
against exclusion is waged on different fronts: in the economic area
(striving for a more active presence of the excluded people in
producing value, in and out of the market); in the social area, by
reinforcing the group and community networks; and in the realm of
the public institutions, through the active exercise of political
rights. In fact, if the public powers manage to take on the mission
of promoting inclusion, it is because certain people and groups
have expressed the problem, transferred it to public opinion and
pressed for it to be included in the local, national or global political
agenda.
This collective action against social exclusion is citizen
participation writ large. We identify also a very clear association
between inclusion and participation, understood not only in
political terms, but also as the ability and opportunities to “take
part” in the different spheres of life. Public participation is
possible in any kind of political regime, although it is only in
democratic regimes that it has institutional channels for
expression and is protected from the state’s arbitrariness. However,
it remains to be seen to what extent the idea of citizen
participation valid in the “real existing democracies” might
promote social inclusion.
If inclusion requires participation and participation only flourishes
in democracy, what is the relationship between inclusion and
democracy? The different uses given to these concepts don’t help
much to clarify the question. We find that, in a single academic
paper, inclusion is considered an essential part of democracy18, but
also one of its main objectives19. So are these two sides to the same
coin? Two parts of a single process mutually feeding each other?
These key questions lead us to the next part of the study, the one
devoted to participation.
18 Sisk, p. 15: “Inclusion and participation are essential to build the trust and
accountability needed for citizen confidence in the quality of local democracy” ; p.
19: “(…) principles of democracy such as participation and inclusion (…)”.
19 Sisk, p. 72: “Mitigating segregation and fostering inclusion are key functions of
democracy”.
3.1 21st century democracy: From quantity to
quality
Democracy has become the only desirable and even conceivable
form of political regime in practice, almost unquestionable in
public (and academic) debate, and called for even by its
detractors. Democracy expanded on a global scale in the last
third of the 20th century (Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin
America in the 80s, Eastern Europe and Africa in the 90s...),
consolidating its success, but at the same time beckoning the
end of the unequivocal western, liberal cultural framework in
which the discourse had been born and extending the meaning of
democracy to a wide range of new meanings, different from or
even contrary to the liberal original.
In the last two decades, political science has therefore moved
from studying the differences between democratic and non-
democratic regimes towards a qualitative analysis of democracy
that takes in consideration phenomena such as efficacy,
corruption and participation. In this sense it has been
particularly interesting to identify a category on which to place
the ever more numerous regimes which formally present
themselves as democracies, but have such serious structural
faults and shortcomings that they end up being placed halfway
between democracy and non democracy, leaning towards one or
the other.
The paradigm of democratic quality is based on the conviction
that democracy is the least harmful of the systems of government
created by humankind, but that it has to be constantly revised
and perfected, changing everything that doesn’t work. We should
be open to all possible forms of democracy, as far as they respect
certain legitimacy and effectiveness standards, for each may be
useful in one context or for a certain function, provided they are
applied correctly. A rigid consideration is therefore not
recommendable in the sense of believing, for example, that an
electoral majoritarian system is always better than a proportional
one; instead, we should always analyse the different factors in
play.
In their introduction of the Report on the state of Democracy in
Catalonia 2007, Anduiza and Pardos (Anduiza and Pardos,
2008:15-46) state that it is enormously difficult to assess the
quality of the democratic system, considering the number of
factors to be analysed and the need for normative criteria for all
of them. Their analysis is very complete and bears in mind both
the instrumental dimension (the procedures for taking decisions)
and the substantive dimension (the results of the decisions) of
democracy. The model they propose is structured through three
different levels or areas of analysis: the government, the citizens
and the intermediate players.
In addition to showing the large number of fronts that a
democratic regime has to deal with simultaneously and
satisfactorily if it wishes to attain quality, the Anduiza and
Pardos model enables us to understand why participation is the
key element for the existence of true democratic citizenship. In
fact, it can be exercised only through participation, and the
model shows us three principles that might be used to measure
its quality: 1. There should be significant opportunities for taking
part in the decision-making; 2. participation should be open to
all citizens, and 3. The participation of each individual must
receive the same consideration and the same weight in the event
of voting.
Furthermore the model tells us that for participation to be
feasible a series of requirements concerning rights and freedoms
have to be met, among which we point out the existence of
social rights. This is further evidence that, without strong social
commitment, a democratic regime cannot achieve a high level of
quality in its government institutions and processes. We will see
how this relationship may be established empirically.
26
3. Democracy and Inclusion: Assessing an ambivalent relationship
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Representation. All citizens should be properly •Equality between electors
represented, without exclusions or •Proportionality in the political preferences
discriminations. •Likeness between represented and representatives
•The government has the capacity to take decisions
Accomplishment. Institutions must be capable with the most possible degree of support
of taking decisions that meet the preferences •The contents of the government decisions reflect the
of the public demands of the public
•The government respects the electoral commitments
of the party or parties that form it
Government
• Influence of the citizens in choosing and controlling
Control. Institutions must be subject to controls their representatives 
to prevent abuse •Capacity of action of the horizontal control mechanisms
over de executive branch (Parliament, Ombudsman, Public
Audit Office...)
Performance. The institutions’ satisfactory •Provision of quality public services
performance must be reflected in a positive •Good assessment of public institutions by the citizens
public assessment and in the quality of the •Low level of corruption
public services
•Physical security and legal efficacy
Rights and freedoms •Respect for fundamental rights
•Social rights and equal opportunities
•Structure of political opportunities for participation
Citizens Participation •Extension
•Equality in participation
• Interest and awareness of the political sphere
Political culture •Trust in democracy
•Agreement on basic political questions
Associations •Pluralismo y densidad asociativas
Players • Internal democracy and performance
acting as
intermediaries Political parties •Linkage between parties and society
between the • Internal democracy
government
and the citizens •Pluralism
Media • Independence
•Professional ethics
Source: Adapted from Anduiza and Pardos (2008)
Table 3: Framework for evaluating democratic quality
Area Aspects to be considered Regulatory principles
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3.2 Democratic quality and human
development
Although there is no official institution with enough recognised
authority to define what a high (or low) quality democracy is and to
evaluate the existing democracies, there are private institutions that
carry out methodical, serious work on the subject. Two of them, the
Freedom House and The Economist, each year prepare and publish
rankings of democratic quality by countries, in which the large part
of the world States are assessed and classified. The so-called
Democracy Index, drawn up by the intelligence unit of the British
weekly The Economist, is calculated from an extensive list of
questions (60) distributed in five blocks: electoral process and
pluralism, government operation, political participation, democratic
political culture and civil rights, all interrelated and making up a
coherent whole. Nevertheless, there are four aspects which are
considered critical and score higher when making an overall
evaluation of the democratic quality of a system: 1. whether the
national elections are free and fair; 2. voter security; 3. the
influence of foreign powers in the government, and 4. the public
administration’s capacity to implement policies. As we see, these
are essential, almost foundational elements of democracy, without
which it becomes impossible or loses its meaning.
Seeking empirical data to ascertain whether there is a significant,
positive correlation between democracy and inclusion, another key
reference, the Human Development Index20 (HDI), drawn up by the
United Nations Development Programme. The HDI had been
repeatedly criticised for the fact that it failed to sufficiently
contemplate the social equality variable, but when it was updated
in November 2010, the authors for the first time calculated an
inequality-adjusted HDI. This version of the HDI includes the losses
of human development caused by inequalities that can be seen in
the three basic dimensions considered in each country (life
expectancy, education and income) and has logically caused
movements with respect to the unadjusted ranking of the same year
2010, which are reflected in the table with green (position gain), or
red arrows (position loss).
The following table, containing the 30 countries with the highest
scores in each index reveals two important things: 1. the strong
similarity between the results of both columns21 and 2. The
similarity between democratic quality and human development is
more intense with the adjusted HDI, when inequalities in health,
education and income are included in the equation.
We can see that the Scandinavian countries are in the top positions
in both tables, whereas other countries with a similar or even
greater economic power are relegated to considerably lower
positions both in the Democracy Index and in the adjusted Human
Development Index. We see a strong correlation between the two
variables, but we don’t have the statistical elements to assert the
causal direction of the correlation, or in which direction the
causality is stronger. However, it intuitively seems that democratic
quality fosters a high level, egalitarian model of human
development, just as a highly developed, egalitarian society
provides perfect conditions for democratic quality. It is most likely
that the two variables feed each other in a virtuous circle.
20 The HDI is obtained by calculating three dimensions: 1. a long healthy life
(measured by life expectancy at birth); 2. Access to knowledge (measured by
average and expected years of schooling) and 3. A good standard of living
(measured by national gross per capita income). The complete report can be
downloaded from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf
21 Japan does not appear on the adjusted HDI ranking; apparently because it failed to
provide the required data.
Table 4: Comparison between DI 2008 and
adjusted HDI 2010 (top-30)
Democracy Index 2008 Inequality-adjusted HD Index 2010
(The Economist Intelligence Unit) (United Nations Development Program)
top-30 of 167 states top-30 of 169 states
1 Sweden 9.88
2 Norway 9.68
3 Iceland 9.65
4 Netherlands 9.53
5 Denmark 9.52
6 Finland 9.25
7 New Zealand 9.19
8 Switzerland 9.15
9 Luxembourg 9.10
10 Australia 9.09
11 Canada 9.07
12 Ireland 9.01
13 Germany 8.82
14 Austria 8.49
15 Spain 8.45
16 Malta 8.39
17 Japan 8.25
18 United States 8.22
19 Czech Republic 8.19
20 Belgium 8.16
21 United Kingdom 8.15
22 Greece 8.13
23 Uruguay 8.08
24 France 8.07
25 Portugal 8.05
26 Mauritius 8.04
27 Costa Rica 8.04
28 South Korea 8.01
29 Italy 7.98
30 Slovenia 7.96
1 Norway 0.876 (—)
2 Australia 0.864 (—)
3 Sweden 0.824 (6)
4 Netherlands 0.818 (3)
5 Germany 0.814 (5)
6 Switzerland 0.813 (7)
7 Ireland 0.813 (2)
8 Canada 0.812 (—)
9 Iceland 0.811 (8)
10 Denmark 0.810 (9)
11 Finland 0.806 (5)
12 United States 0.799 (8)
13 Belgium 0.794 (5)
14 France 0.792 (—)
15 Czech Republic 0.790 (13)
16 Austria 0.787 (9)
17 Spain 0.779 (3)
18 Luxembourg 0.775 (6)
19 Slovenia 0.771 (10)
20 Greece 0.768 (2)
21 United Kingdom 0.766 (5)
22 Slovakia 0.764 (9)
23 Israel 0.763 (8)
24 Italy 0.752 (1)
25 Hungary 0.736 (11)
26 Estonia 0.733 (8)
27 South Korea 0.731 (15)
28 Cyprus 0.716 (7)
29 Poland 0.709 (11)
30 Portugal 0.700 (10)
Source: Gabba in preparation from data provided by the official reports.
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3.3 The dark side: Excluding and exclusion
producing democracies
If the relationship between democracy and inclusion was so perfect,
and being most of the countries in the world under democratic
regimes, some of which hundreds of years old, why is it that we are
faced with a problem of large-scale social inclusion, also present in
the most consolidated democracies? Something does not quite fit.
Maybe democracy is not always inclusive, or not to the extent that
would be desirable in countries that have joined the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Unfortunately, the world is full of
political regimes, institutions and practices that consider themselves
and are mainly seen as democracies and which, under close scrutiny,
exclude a fair amount of the population. Exclusion is often obvious,
and even legally sanctioned, but on many occasions it is more
subtle and has to be sought between the lines.
This is a worrying question that cannot be skirted. Can a society
only be constituted as democratic and inclusive of certain social
groups, by excluding other groups and categories of people who
necessarily have to be left out? Is exclusion/inclusion a zero-sum
game, mediated by a democratic polity ruled by the social groups
with more resources and power?
3.3.1 The historical origins of democratic exclusion
According to the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor “Democracy,
particularly liberal democracy, is a great philosophy of inclusion. Rule
of the people, by the people, for the people; and where the “people”
is supposed to mean everybody. (...) Democracy offers the prospect of
the most inclusive politics of human history. And yet, there is
something in the dynamics of democracy which pushes to exclusion”
(Taylor, 1998). The first democracies in historical record, those of
Athens and other Greek cities, were indeed profoundly excluding
(women, slaves, foreigners...). Two thousand years later, the same
North American democracy that dazzled the world was founded on
the absolute political and social exclusion of the black population,
and maintained its segregation well into the 20th century22. All
European democracies started with some form of limiting suffrage,
normally dependent on the ownership of material assets, and
maintained women’s political exclusion for decades. In both cases,
despite meeting the formal requirements of democratic
participation, there was de facto exclusion which, through different
segregation policies, deprived not a small part of the population of
the right to effectively exercise democratic politics.
If the demos is defined in terms of participation and social
inclusion, two types of fundamental tensions are posed: on the one
hand, vertical tension brought in by the elitisation of participation,
on the other hand, the horizontal tension resulting from its
territorialisation. In the first classical Greek democracies, the
vertical tension was made explicit through the classification of the
city’s populations into distinct groups, to whom different rights and
freedoms were assigned. The horizontal tension, on its part, was
articulated through mechanisms such as ostracism, that is, the
temporary or permanent expulsion from the polis. In short,
democracy was since its beginnings also a tool of social exclusion.
3.3.2 Explicit and implicit exclusion in contemporary
democracies
In modern times, the horizontal tensions in defining the demos
have been revealed in the question of the inclusion of two specific
groups: minorities and foreigners, which in some cases account for a
large part or even the majority of the total population. The oldest
question is that of the rights of non assimilated national minorities
that were already present inside nation states when these were
created; the processes of nation and State building were carried
out, in no few cases, by excluding national minorities, and only
recently has this characteristic tendency of the nation state towards
uniformity been turned round with new policies of recognition and
institutional designs better suited to the pluri-national nature of
the majority of States in the world. The degree of complexity and
diversification acquired by contemporary societies has made it ever
more difficult to sustain a purely ethno-national concept of the
people (the demos), without breaching the principles on which the
state’s democratic procedures are based.
The second, more recent, kind of problem is caused by the large
increase in the migrant population which has come along with the
deepening of the economic globalisation process. Even in the most
open democracies, the foreign population has found it very difficult
to access political rights, and the proliferation of laws excluding
foreigners from basic rights, or even directly sentencing them to
illegality, is today one of the most important challenges of
democracy and an unequivocal symptom of de-democratization35.
In regard to the vertical tension, in modern times democracy has
sketched a much more appealing historical horizon, with the seemingly
unstoppable extension of suffrage, overcoming class and gender
barriers. The universal suffrage, introduced in practically all democratic
regimes, although some even as late as the end of the 20th century,
represented an enormous success in the process of inclusion through
22 Through the so-called Jim Crow Laws that consecrated the doctrine of “separate but
equal”; a model which by the way was copied, enhanced and maintained for longer
as Apartheid in South Africa.
23 The concept of "de-democratization" is borrowed of Charles Tilly (2007), who has
theorized about the historical process of democratization as far-reaching, complex,
ambiguous and reversible.
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citizenship. However, the achievement of suffrage in many cases failed
to immediately and effectively include the most disadvantaged social
classes in democratic politics. By simplifying the pluralism of society,
the very principle of political representation seems to be not very
functional for social inclusion. But the most serious problem is that, in
many places, electoral systems have been set up in such a way that
certain ideological options are underrepresented or directly excluded
from representation. The examples might range from the majority
electoral systems with a single round voting, which discriminate third
political forces and seriously hinder new parties entering the system,
from the percentage barriers of some proportional systems, which have
similar effects, to more subtle forms of manipulation, such as
designing or redesigning the electoral districts with the intention of
modifying the electoral map, often known as gerrymandering24. In a
pure representative system of democracy, where participation is
restricted to exercising one's vote every x years, the falsification of the
representation systems means that large sectors or even the majority
of society are, if not legally, in fact excluded from democratic politics.
Whether it is due to the endogamy of the political elites, or to the
structural “shortcomings” in the representation systems, electoral
abstention has risen in almost the entire world, and this, along with
systematically leaving outside from the democratic process large social
groups, turns the idea of universal suffrage into a chimera. In the
context of the crisis of representative democracy, the discussions point
at two clearly opposed types of response: 
• Firstly, democracy should be deepened or democratised by
rethinking the effective conditions for exercising citizenship and
promoting political inclusion, not only from institutional policy, but
through mobilisation and social policies to guarantee the material
bases of participation. 
• By contrast, and obviously banishing the democratic ideal, the
decision-making should be transferred in key areas (monetary
policy, employment regulation, education, technological
development,...) to supposedly “independent” bodies formed by
“experts” who are generally no more than representatives of each
country’s economic elites.
The demands for democratisation and de-democratisation coexist in
the public debate, sometimes within the same government or the same
ideological current, and this not only confuses citizens, but hinders
changes that might improve the quality of the real existing democracy.
The democratic State maintains a complex, ambivalent
relationship with inclusion, but what happens to the
organisations that, in principle, do represent social interests?
The concept of “civil society” embodies an enormous range of
players, with specific approaches and practices. As intermediate
bodies between family and society, most are privileged spaces
of participation and inclusion; an inclusion, however, that is
selective in many cases. We cannot forget the fact that a large
part of the formally constituted organisations operate along the
lines of a club, which strictly limits the benefits of its activity
to its members and exerts the right to decide over new
admissions, regulated according to the composition and
purpose of the institution. Furthermore, to be attractive to
their potential members, organisations often try to maximise
their members’ benefits, logically at the expense of those
excluded. This is how the classic, well-positioned organizations
work, for instance the political parties, business organisations
and unions. Although they might achieve general benefits
which are reinvested in the whole of the population, the most
attractive, tangible benefits are usually reserved for their
members.
We can observe the growth of new phenomena of exclusion, as
for example the so-called “gated communities”, along with the
modernisation of ancestral excluding practices, such as private
“exclusive” schools, often promoted by groups of parents. There
are other, apparently more inclusive organisations, such as co-
operative firms, which also apply the logic of exclusion, in a
more or less covered manner. According to some authors (see:
Jordan, 1996), this is a growing phenomenon explained as a
strategic response by individuals and families to the progressive
dismantling of the structures and security networks provided by
the Welfare State. As the public “umbrella” collapses, whoever
is able will rush to form and enter ever more particularistic, and
therefore excluding, groups.
To sum up, without pretending to question the need for strong
and autonomous associations, we should be aware of the fact
that any organization may stage excluding practices, sanctioned
by the democratic will of its members. That is the reason why,
while the democratic state requires civil society to counter
possible excesses and respond to the public demands, civil
society also requires a sufficiently strong, legitimised state to
defend the public rights and to express a view of general
interest, opposed to the excluding pulse of private interests.
Note: Associations and exclusion: the dark side
of civil society
24 This practice is known by the name of gerrymandering. The term comes from
Elbridge Gerry, governor of Massachusetts (USA). By 1812, Gerry, worried that his
party, the Democratic-Republican, failed to win in districts north and west of the
state, decided to unify all these districts into one, which thereby got less seats in
the legislature. Reporters noticed that the district thus created had the shape of a
salamander, which they named Gerry-Mander. The term was successful, moving to
designate any form of manipulation of electoral districts for partisan purposes (a
very complete explanation of the term and its contemporary uses can be found at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering).
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3.4 Is it possible to achieve inclusion in an
undemocratic country or in one with a low
quality democracy?
Arguments and evidence point to the preliminary conclusion that
democracy and inclusion are two associated phenomena that
mutually condition and reinforce each other, but we have also seen
that real existing democracies consent or actively promote varying
degrees of political exclusion in their structures and procedures. The
generalised crisis of the model of representative democracy is a fact
that we cannot ignore.
In all processes of political exclusion, through either the electoral
roll or the electoral system, not only do we see resistance to share
power, but also strong mistrust on the part of the dominant elites,
towards citizens in general and towards the most disadvantaged
groups in particular. The criterion and capacity of the socially
excluded or vulnerable to live autonomously and responsibly in a
democracy is mistrusted, but the argument used to try to justify the
exclusion is not this, for politically it would be unsustainable, but
rather that the elites are better prepared. It is argued that the
people or groups at the forefront of the institutions are the only
ones that can provide the necessary (political) view and (technical)
knowledge for drawing up the right policies.
The most consequent elitists claim that it is possible to advance
towards social inclusion without a democratic polity, as shown by
certain historical and modern examples such as the giddy
development of the People’s Republic of China and other Asiatic
countries. Indeed, from a strictly economicist viewpoint, inclusion
without participation might seem plausible. One of the most striking
things about the new global economy is precisely the unequal
relationship between democracy and market. While democracy seems
to need the market (we do not have examples to contradict this for
the moment), the market does not seem to need democracy in order
to function reasonably well. Nonetheless, we have already seen that
the economic variable in itself cannot entirely explain exclusion and
therefore, to take it as the sole protagonist of inclusion policies opens
the door to insufficient or wrong answers to the problem of exclusion.
The question that must be put is: Can the excluded people -and
those whose strong vulnerability leaves them at risk of exclusion-
advance towards inclusion without taking part in a meaningful way
in the process of policy making?
Certainly, the cases of the so-called illustrated despotism; that is, of
leaders and elites endorsed with enough social awareness and
capacity to drive beneficial policies for the most vulnerable and
excluded classes cannot be underrated or discarded right away. To
mention a very well-known example, there are people in Spain who
defend the forty years lasting General Franco’s regime, as it
supposedly enabled an economic opening which generated growth and
jobs in sufficient quantities to be able to bring millions of people into
an urban consumer society. This is a highly idyllic view that hides the
enormous costs and shortcomings of that dictatorship, for the people
who emigrated to the cities (because life in the country was one of
poverty and frequently outright misery) usually endured in their new
accommodations long years of severe exclusion, getting subsistence
salaries, precarious housing and deficient or non-existent services.
This was all largely overcome thanks to a social and political
activation, neither foreseen nor desired by the regime, through
neighbours’ and workers’ unions and political parties that were
initially clandestine, afterwards tolerated and finally protagonists of
the transition to democracy. By extrapolating the Spanish experience
to that of other societies that are changing fast to economic
modernity in undemocratic contexts, we might consider the hypothesis
that the inclusion achieved by non-democratic ways probably will be:
• Precarious, because it doesn’t imply the incorporation of the
person in society in a stable form, under equal rights and
obligations, but it all depends rather on more or less temporary
and volatile situations.
• Spurious, because in the best case inclusion is “graciously”
granted by the well-off social groups, thus preventing awareness-
raising and change in the side of the excluded individuals and
groups, in the sense of acquiring skills for personal autonomy
and social transformation.
• Assimilating, in the sense of denying individuality, for often the
price of inclusion is to renounce the cultural and social bases of
one's own identity and (to aim) at becoming a new “normal” and
“integrated” person.
• We might say that this is a subordinated inclusion,
subordinated to the State and to those that dominate it: the
leader, the bureaucratic caste, the parties, the big industrials and
landowners, etc. In a context of subordination, the routes for
inclusion become clientele paths, where access to basic goods
and services comes in exchange for party-political loyalty, thus
opening broad areas for corruption.
If social exclusion/inclusion is understood as a plural, dynamic,
open process subject to substantial modifications depending on the
players’ attitude, their participation in all spheres of daily life
(neighbourly, school, cultural, economic...) must clearly play an
important role. Public rights only materialise to the extent that
social players make them real (for themselves and also in support of
those objectively impeded due to their age, legal situation, etc.).
Inclusion can therefore only be caused with the direct involvement
of its beneficiaries. The short-term and reactive inclusion policies
may briefly relieve extreme situations, but fail to confront the
causes of the problem and they don’t aim at the training and
empowerment of the persons at risk.
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In the field of comparative politics we find many different
typologies of democratic regimes: consociative or majority,
presidential or parliamentary, representative or participative, etc.
Models of democracy are often built and conceptualised around
some defining trait, considered more relevant than any other. We
have, among others, liberal democracies, parliamentary democracies,
republican democracies and also, significantly, inclusive democracies
(Fotopoulos, 2008) and participatory democracies (Pateman, 1970).
The question we have to deal with at this point is whether
participatory democracy has the potential to develop and perfect
democracy, in the sense of promoting inclusion and minimising the
excluding logics we can see in all democratic systems.
4.1 The model of participatory democracy
Participatory democracy has been one of the most successful types
of democracy in recent decades, especially when applied to local
governments. But, what do we mean by “participatory democracy”?
Mostly it refers to a series of mechanisms enabling a direct
involvement of the public in the affairs of government, which is
conceived to complement and enrich the usual devices of
representative democracy. Nevertheless, the coexistence of
representative and participatory institutions and logics is not
necessarily peaceful, but there are usually tensions. In fact, there
is a powerful strand of thought which denies the possibility of this
coexistence. The absence of academic consensus on the subject is
also shown by the development of highly diverse models of
participation –all of them under the "participatory" label–,
different with respect to the type, scope and protagonists of the
participation: direct democracy, associative democracy, deliberative
democracy, etc.
The existence of a model known as participatory democracy does
not suggest that the other models can do without participation.
Democracy can be considered a set of three key elements in
necessary coexistence: representation, deliberation and
participation. The proportion, combination and specific position of
these elements might vary, but they can never completely
disappear if a regime is to remain democratic. A democracy
without participation would be illegitimate, a democracy without
representation would be ungovernable and a democracy without
deliberation would be completely unstable and unpredictable.
Taking the words literally, the name ‘participatory democracy’ would
actually be tautological, because democracy is either participatory
or is not democracy. However, we use this concept to designate a
form of democracy that places the main stress on participation, over
and above the other two elements of the equation (representation
and deliberation).
Theoretically, participatory democracy not only favours public
participation and social inclusion, but makes of them its own
political foundations, because here political representation aspires
to coincide fully with the whole of the social body considered in its
complex plurality. For the model of democracy labelled as
participatory, social inclusion is therefore an end in itself and the
4. Participation as a spearhead for inclusion in the democratic system:
Promises, scope and limits
Figure 2. Democracy as participation,
representation and deliberation
Democracy
Representation
Party system, institutional design...
Participation
Electoral participation, social
mobilisation...
Deliberation
Reflection and debate:
institutions, academy, media...
Source: Author.
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exclusion of any group intrinsically means a lack of legitimacy.
Therefore, the effective exercise of citizenship cannot be limited to
the election of representatives every x years (as happens in
representative democracy) nor to the representatives producing
supposedly inclusive consensus without counting on public
participation. On the contrary, the election of representatives or
their deliberative practices should be considered no more than
moments and parts of a wider democratic process which would
always have to be subordinated to the principle that citizens must
have the effective capacity to decisively intervene in the making of
public decisions.
4.2 The values of participatory democracy
Until the 1960s, the prevailing theories and forms of democracy
were based on the primacy of the elites and the limited, if not
residual, role of the citizens in public decisions. Those adjusted
better to a Fordist kind of industrial society, based on instrumental
rationality and hierarchies, in a general context of remarkable social
and cultural homogeneity. The change towards a new kind of society
that started in the late 1960s and1970s was accompanied by the
vindication and revitalisation of a forgotten part of democratic
tradition that started with Rousseau, Paine and Stuart Mill. Those
authors shared the belief that, beyond a procedure for choosing
governments and preventing tyranny, democracy was a value in
itself, able to promote human development in the most positive
sense of the term.
This idea of stronger democracy is based precisely on participation.
Participation which is attributed all these public benefits in so far as
“it increases the sense of political efficacy, feeds concern for collective
problems and contributes to form an active, informed citizenship”
(Gallego, 2008:6, quoting Pateman). Through participation,
individuals, and especially those belonging to the most disadvantaged
social groups, can learn to govern themselves by assessing and
expressing their own interests and preferences and by taking the
interests and preferences of others into account, thus becoming aware
of the complexity of public questions. We can see in this process of
learning and perfecting, of humanisation through political activity,
one of the purest expressions of human freedom because each person
can decide on their future as a member of the community, with
results that are always open and unpredictable (Gallego, 2008:7). At
the end of the day, this ‘democratisation of democracy’ through
greater participation should not only affect the public institutions,
but also drive the transformation of the family and work, to make
them less oppressive and more open to human creativity.
Having come this far, we can see that the similarities between the
ideal of participatory democracy and the ideal of social inclusion
understood as the kind of critical autonomy we considered in the
previous section are strong, not only because participatory
democracy requires the inclusion of all citizens in taking decisions,
but also for their optimistic view of human nature. Nevertheless, as
we will see later, in the real world participatory democracy has
edges, contradictions and side-effects that remove it from the
simplicity of the ideal.
4.3 The different views of participation
In the 1990s, participatory democracy achieved a high degree of
acceptance, both in public institutions and outside of them,
among certain scholars, public officials and practitioners. For a
moment, the old school elitists seemed to be secluded to their
winter quarters, i.e. the headquarters of the political parties and
big employers’ organisations. Participation gains the overhand in
discourse, but not all the authors, and less still all institutions
and political players do speak the same language when speaking
about participation. The discourse of participatory democracy
might be said to be adopted and adapted by the main political
ideologies of the time, and placed at the service of very different
projects. Assuming the typology proposed by Barnes, Newman
and Sullivan (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007), we might
identify four large discourses on participation:
• The responsible public discourse, which stresses the public
duty towards others and towards the state for the democratic
system to work correctly. An appeal is made to the decisive
importance of the family and the non-governmental entities in
34
setting out society. To this comes a stress on the importance
of self-government, understood in several ways: as individual
self-discipline, as community self-government and/or as the
individuals and communities’ relationships with the public
administrations, which should be based on autonomy.
• The consuming public discourse fixes its interest on
individuals’ expectations and experiences using public
services. According to the premises of methodological
individualism, this discourse conceptualises participation as
the public capacity to choose in a free market of goods and
services. Inheritor of the liberal tradition, the consuming
public is not simply a passive receiver of the consumerist
machinery, but aims to become an active player in choosing
the public goods and services to which they are entitled as
taxpayers.
• The stakeholder public discourse is based on a public which
has (individually or collectively) an interest (material and/or
ideal) in the good government of public matters. In this
context, participation is valued and practised as a way to
express one’s opinions on public matters. From a pluralist
conception of public interest, the discourse is concerned with
identifying different individual and/or collective interests at
stake and with establishing mechanisms to enable the
effective incorporation of these interests in the decision-
making processes.
• The empowered public discourse focuses on the disadvantaged
or cast aside groups and communities, i.e. the excluded.
Considering that behind this exclusion we will find the
institutionalisation of discrimination by reason of class, sex,
origin or any other, the discourse of the empowered public
claims the need to generate processes to collectively train the
excluded, so that they might be able to act in their own
name, that is, autonomously with respect to the beneficiaries
of the status quo.
These are pure models of discourse, which are rare to find
applied in institutions in their original form. Most frequently,
elements are combined from the different discourses, with
specific accents depending on the government’s political colour
and other national and local factors, for each discourse on
participation is backed by different implicit normative
frameworks (liberal, republican, autonomous, communitarian...)
and their adjustments to (and congruence with) the models of
democracy can vary significantly. The following table shows the
basic features and implications of each model.
Beyond the ideological assumptions inherent to every discourse,
there is nothing to make us think that these models exclude each
other. To put an example, the fact that a city's rotary club
organises a charity campaign does not prevent that in this very
same city a participative process is organized to draw up a
strategic plan, in which all relevant stakeholders are invited. This
in turn does not impede that a local council of users of the
health centre is set up, as this does not prevent the realization
Table 5: the participation discourses and their implications
Discourse Player Priority purpose Preferential instrument(s) Closest ideology
Responsible
public
Consuming
public
Stakeholder
public
Empowered
public
Individuals as
members of society
Individuals as
consumers
Organised groups
and associations
Excluded groups and
communities
Conservative
Liberal
Social Democrat
Radical-democratic
Strengthening of the State through
the traditional social structures
(status quo)
Efficiency and efficacy of public
services (value for money)
Integration and equity (a cohesive
and fair society)
Strengthening and emancipation
Corporate based participation
bodies; councils of nobles
Councils of users, channels for
making complaints and claims
Bodies and processes of
deliberation; political and
union activism
Community development
plans; direct democracy
(referendums)
Source:  Author, departing from Barnes,
Newman and Sullivan, 2007.
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of a project for the self-organisation and skills-raising of the
community of immigrant women. Obviously there may be points
of friction and conflict between the different processes, when for
instance the participants of the strategic plan process touch
upon interests of some conspicuous Rotarians, or when the
members of the council of users of the health centre require
health issues to be given priority in the strategic plan, or when
the immigrant women demand a chair (or two) in that council of
users. But all this, far from being negative, would be a sign of
the democratic health of the community.
We would therefore dare say that Barnes, Newman and Sullivan’s
four discourses of participation are not only mutually compatible,
but it could be even positive that they exist together, for each
addresses a type of public, has specific goals and uses specific
instruments. If it is done properly, the interplay generated by the
four models can provide a kind of checks and balances between
the different institutions and groups, with a tendency towards
new and better power equilibriums in each community.
Nevertheless, wherever participatory democracy has been driven from
the institutions, as it has been in most cases, the most commonly
used and applied discourse has been that of the shareholder public.
Why? Given the intrinsically conservative drive of existing
institutions set, and the prevalence of a system of representative
democracy, we can consider the hypothesis that the discourse of the
shareholder public has been chosen because it is universalist, aimed
at all citizens, and above all, because it gives the State a large role
without questioning its way of addressing problems, or not as
radically as would be the case of the consuming or the empowered
public discourses. The stakeholder public discourse is moderate and
therefore easier to accommodate institutionally. The problem,
however, as we will see below, is that excessive prioritisation of this
kind of less risky and less transforming discourse to the detriment of
others, has contributed to the progressive deterioration of the ideal
of participatory democracy.
4.4 Difficulties and mistakes of participatory
democracy
After the 1990s, and especially in Western Europe and Latin
America, there was almost no political programme or city project
that did not turn to public participation as a universal remedy,
applicable to all kinds of public policies and especially the new and
emerging ones. It was then that, alongside the regulations of
participation, we began to see everywhere advisory committees
constituted by citizens and organized around issues, territories or
services, together with more elaborate concepts such as the Agenda
21, the educative city projects, the public councils, the participative
integral plans, the participative strategic plans and even
participative budgets, with almost mythical resonance in the case of
the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre. These processes gave new wind to
local governments and helped them to make the transition towards
systems of local governance, build up, at least apparently, with more
open, permeable and thus potentially more inclusive institutions.
However, with the years participatory democracy has accumulated
not only successes, but also some disastrous failures. It has become
obvious that public participation finds it difficult to deliver what it
promises, and its application has lost force. Significantly, some of
the accusations brought against participatory democracy are similar
to those that the paradigm of social inclusion has had to face.
4.4.1 Which players? Participation for inclusion or exclusion?
The participation discourse based on the involvement of stakeholders
in preparing public policies first of all poses the problem of who
defines and grants to whom the status of stakeholder. As the public
The consuming public discourse, which at first might not
seem very suitable in a progressive approach to inclusion,
provides potential for improvement, too. In the case of
social policies, the classical Welfare State has been
characterised as working from a strongly technocratic logic,
with well-known results: apparatuses capable of managing
monetary transfers and certain basic homogenous public
services with relative efficiency and efficacy, but, on the
other hand, structurally quite incapable of receiving signals
from the environment (personal, users, public) on the
possible problems, shortcomings or chances for improvement,
in order to be able to adapt to the changes through
sophistication and quality. The constitutional principle of
equality does not only mean “equal treatment for that which
is equal”, but also, through pure logic, “different treatment
for that which is different”, and in a society of accelerating
differentiation, the State's effort for inclusion cannot be
sustained on a few simple, homogenous and stable policies,
but rather the actions have to be diversified, the target
groups have to be segmented and provided with tools that
enable the assessment of the results of the actions and the
adaptation of the policies to the new needs. In this context,
it might be entirely functional for beneficiaries/consumers to
participate more in the social policies at are at the basis of
inclusion.
Note: The role of the consuming public in impro-
ving social policies
4.4.2 What purpose? Participation to make politics or to hide
politics?
The effective public use of instruments of participatory democracy
very often does not come up to the initial expectations. Few people
tend to take part in them and it is very difficult to keep them
participating once they have tried. Apart from occupational and
family difficulties, which reduce the amount of time that could be
devoted to public affairs, probably many people who have time have
decided not to take part because they are not sure what the
purpose of participation is. Is it just to get informed personally by
the decision makers? Providing feedback? Making real decisions?
What should we understand by “participation”? We know that, in a
representative democracy, the elected governments define the
agenda and decide what will or will not be open to participation;
and it’s a fact that, in most cases, governments choose a low profile
participation, one that is less risky for the State but also less
attractive to the public.
Cleaver (Cleaver, 1999:598-600) hits the nail on the head by saying
that the main cause of participatory democracy’s loss of prestige has
been the assumption of an excessively optimistic, a-critical
discourse of participation, stripped of all kind of real vocation of
social transformation. According to this naive view, participation is
good in itself, and its success is only a question of choosing and
correctly applying the right participative techniques in each kind of
process, without considering the basic objectives and the meaning
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institutions start these processes, it is normally the governments
who reserve for themselves this key prerogative and use it to ensure
that the participants’ universe lies within parameters of “normality”
defined from the institutional logic itself. This simple fact, which is
usually presented as “logical” and “natural”, opens the door to
inequality and exclusion in participation.
Beyond this form of deliberate exclusion, there is another one which
is implicit and acquires a specific weight if nothing is done to correct
it. We refer to the fact that not all people make the same use of the
participation opportunities offered by institutions. Participation is
clearly unequa25, and the bias are socially structured: Men take part
clearly more than women, the elderly more than the young, nationals
more than immigrants and the middle-upper classes, usually people
with high education levels, more than the middle-lower or low
classes. This is a serious, structural problem that brings with it that
the new mechanisms and processes of public participation too often
end up reproducing the existing power structures, without promoting
any kind of transformation; participation is supposedly made for
inclusion but fails to reach the vulnerable persons, not to mention
the excluded, with sufficient force.
Inequality in participation is a very serious threat for participatory
democracy, because it undermines its legitimacy and support in the
ranks of the people committed to inclusion. There is a progressive
anti-participation discourse which, arguing from fully democratic
positions, committed to equality and equity, doesn’t admit that a
weak and biased participation gains influence over the decisions of
democratically elected governments. They believe that a
representative democracy is better to guarantee equality for all
citizens in their access to public resources and services.
Paradoxically, a certain kind of exclusion may sometimes be
used in participatory processes to favour a more inclusive
participation. Analysing the experience of participatory
processes in Denmark, Agger and Larsen (Agger and Larsen,
2009) identify, alongside the structured exclusion of players
(who defines and awards the category of “stakeholder”) and
the discursive exclusion of the subjects (who defines the
agenda and what is open or closed to participation), a third
kind of exclusion, temporary and instrumental, that the
promoters of the process may use to increase participation. It
is about silencing players who have an excessive role in the
process, so that other players who normally get little or no
attention can be listened to. This third kind of exclusion may
be a risky, but apparently effective, way to counter the
tendency to the elitisation of participation.
Selective exclusion is also used in policies intended to
promote the self organisation of minority social groups. One
example of this would be the exclusion of men from women's
groups in order to enhance their empowerment, by allowing
the latter to define their own needs and demands, not
intervened by the former. This clearly shows that certain
temporary or partial exclusion may be functional to generate
freer, fairer and more inclusive conditions of participation.
The same could be said for indigenous minorities and other
singular groups that require specific treatment, so that
effective conditions can be guaranteed for their democratic
participation.
Note: Selective exclusion as a tool of positive dis-
crimination to improve participation
25 By “participate”, we refer both to the fact of taking part and, in the specific case
of commissions, councils or discussion forums, to the fact of effectively present
one's own positions and interests.
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of the activity. Needless to say that, acting in institutions, these
enthusiasts of participation have often been victims of realpolitiker,
who have manipulated and used “participation” for all kinds of
distraction and delay manoeuvres. This was certainly another way to
understand participation, as a smokescreen for the better hiding of
the real issues and decisions.
Beyond the error of considering a mechanical model of
participation, based on constructions that are very neat but also
rigid and incapable of taking society’s pulse, failure is accelerated
by the sensation of deceit and/or waste of time. When the public
realise that the proposed participation is false, because the
institutional power is playing with marked cards, or that it is
irrelevant, because what is put on the line in the participative
processes is very small compared with the size of the basic
problem or problems, or that it simply does not compensate in
terms of cost-benefit (participation always entails, at least,
opportunity costs), disappointment falls upon the participant
public. Disappointment may be big or small, but most often it
leads to a resigned or maybe furious “I am not going to do it
again”.
4.4.3 Consensus and Dissent: Why so much participation, if we
don't like conflict?
Participation and inclusion affect the values, norms and procedures
by which the political battle is regulated in pluralist societies. As a
particular variant of democracy, participatory democracy is
characterised by the fact that citizens take a direct part in
producing, managing and resolving of conflicts of interest.
Democracy is not the same as eradicating the conflict of interests,
but rather the institutionalisation of its organised and peaceful
treatment.
Unfortunately, the discourse on participation and inclusion in
practically all variants and forms has tended to displace the conflict
of interests from the core of its arguments, as though the point of
democracy was to conjure it and not to express it institutionally. On
the contrary, we think that, democracy today should turn to an
agonistic model, a decision-making organisation that starts from
the irreducibility of the interests inherent to pluralist societies,
places the inevitable nature of the conflict at the centre of the
discussion and confronts the viability of its resolution by means of
democratic proceedings (Mouffe, 2000).
The proceedings of participatory democracy, especially in their
application on the local level, have typically sought out and
produced social consensus. This has linked the participative models
directly with social inclusion, but only accepting one kind of
resolution, namely a consensus that eradicates the existing conflict.
By stressing so much the consensual aspects, participatory
democracy on a local scale has tended to be seen by authorities
more as a way to legitimise their governmental action than as the
institutional structure that makes possible a direct involvement of
the public in the policy process.
4.4.4 Building a stool with a single leg. Where are
representation and deliberation?
A final structural problem of participatory democracy comes from the
lack of clearness concerning the rules and relationship between the
three elements we have considered key for democracy: Participation,
representation and deliberation. It is not clear whether participatory
democracy was intended to complement and improve the
representative system, or to overcome it. What has been seen on a
fair number of occasions is how the stress placed on participation
meant that less attention was paid to the other two, and their key
role both in regulatory models and in the true operation of
democratic politics was ignored.
There has been a tendency to underrate the logic of representation,
as if the parties, programs, elections and the democratically elected
governments were no more than secondary actors or figurants on
the participative stage. Democratic governments actually still hold
the main power devices, and their neglect has but reduced the
quality of their composition and the consistency and transparency of
their practices. What’s more, by presuming that it is enough to “do
participation” for brilliant ideas and very powerful results to come
out, the dimension of deliberation has been excessively ignored.
Participative processes have therefore abounded which have ended
up giving poor quality results through poor conception and
execution.
4.5 The participatory democracy we need
Many items should be taken into account when assessing the
relationship between democracy and inclusion. Inclusion and
exclusion seem to be two sides to the same coin; a coin that is
tossed into the air when building a democratic regime. In this game,
some individuals, the well-to-do men of the dominant ethnic group
have always drawn heads, whereas others, poor and immigrant
women or the members of minority ethnic groups have always drawn
tails. History has revealed clear signs of progress in this sense, but
much remains to be done to minimise this dark side of democracy. If
the aim is to achieve inclusive participation, the institutions should
check the exclusion generated in their constitutional framework, the
electoral system and the administrations’ normal functioning, and
should set up spaces and processes to offer participation also to the
most disadvantaged, least powerful social groups.
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By now we know that labelling an institution or policy
“participatory” is no guarantee of anything. Be it with or without
intention, the fact is that the best organised, most culturally
developed public and private players know how to place these
mechanisms at their service and to impose their objectives, often
presented as solutions of consensus. And a participation which is
poor in diversity, in methods and in results casts serious doubts on
the democratic nature of participatory democracy.
However, the criticism of participatory democracy does not mean
that we have to abandon it and return to a purely representative
model that is suffering a still deeper crisis. Participatory democracy
is still valid and necessary, but it has to be reconceived and restored
in a broader context, that of a democracy that combines
representative, deliberative and participative elements to achieve
institutional quality and social inclusion.
To eradicate the styles and logics that separate individuals and
groups from the political processes, the institutions committed to
participatory democracy must take risks. They must give much more
importance to the community, by particularly promoting self
organisation and education among the people who are excluded
and/or are at risk of being so. This means also overcoming the crude
mechanisms of political “profitability” that have been habitual up to
now, associated with individualistic and resolute leadership styles.
The argument used to deny the empowerment of the weakest, which
is their supposed incapacity for discerning and deciding what is best
for them, does not have a sufficient base. While accepting the
limitations of the human condition, we also know that each person
is the best qualified to identify her own true interests. We are also
told that only specialists are sufficiently prepared to take decisions
for the whole of the public; however, the complex problems that
affect contemporary societies are particular and context-bound, in
the sense that they do not entirely respond to the logic of a
universal instrumental rationality. There are too many variables with
multiple relationships between them and chains of causality that are
very difficult to establish. Therefore, the role to be played by the
specialists in resolving them is limited, and always insufficient. In a
complex society democratic politics does not become superfluous,
but rather more necessary still.
The argument of mistrust at the lower social classes’ capacity for
judgment is even more suspicious when we compare it to the quite
generalized, naive confidence in the leading elites, albeit
traditional, patrimonial, party-based or technical-scientific. Normally
it is presumed that their judgments will be more based on objective
reasons, devoid of particular or class interests. While admitting that
this phenomenon can be given in individual cases, historical
experience shows that the elites, as a group or class, have made use
of ideology as a tool for defending their interests and have only
made significant concessions to subordinated classes and groups
when these have effectively mobilised and pressed for them. Civil,
political and social rights have never been “awarded”; they have
always been conquered by mobilisation.
At this point we can turn the argument of mistrust in a way that
strengthens the case for participation. People should be mistrusted,
yes, but especially those who hold and administer positions of
power, because it is there where people take decisions for the whole
of society and therefore can really do significant harm (or good).
This approach, masterfully developed by the French historian Pierre
Rosanvallon, leads us to the conclusion that participation of those
who do not have power is necessary in order to monitor, control and
assess the leading elites’ use of power, even though these governing
elites have been chosen by democratic proceedings. He calls this
current of mobilisation and participation, caused by a radical and
permanent mistrust of democratic governments “counter democracy”
(Rosanvallon, 2008). Well applied counter-democratic practices
based on constructive mistrust can be a powerful weapon to force
governments to implement truly substantive inclusion policies. The
solution would be, therefore, to give a more powerful role to the
public in preparing, monitoring and assessing policies.
Up to now, participatory democracy has operated as a complement
to improve the democracies based on representation and
deliberation. However, this extension of democracy, beyond the
praiseworthy reinforcement of deliberation often induced by a
greater participation, has revealed the limits of liberal democracy,
marked by the autonomy of civil society and the negative
conception of freedom as non-interference. It is no good that
citizen participation be conceived as an exchange of legitimacy for
occasional access to the decision-making arena, or worse still, as a
tool for blaming the citizens for the contradictions of public
management. If it is to reach fulfilment, participatory democracy
must accept that social autonomy is inevitable and that the very
complexity of pluralist societies cannot be satisfactorily represented.
In this sense too, the participative discourse will also recover its
credibility by honestly opening up to dissent and criticism.
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No matter how deep and refined the knowledge on a social problem
might be, its understanding is not sufficient for a socially relevant
contribution. We know that what is truly interesting for
practitioners in the political and technical administrations and for
the public in general is to get hints about possible solutions to
their most pressing problems. Unfortunately, social sciences have
tended to focus on the problems and have found significant
difficulty in drawing up alternatives for action. Fully aware of this
shortcoming, in this final part of the report we will try to jump
from the theory to the institutional designs.
We have defined inclusion as a political problem and have done
so with a great deal of ambition, because it is not only a
question of relieving the pain of those “who cannot follow”, but
what we intend is to overcome the fracture between the included
an excluded by pointing towards an (ideal) future society “where
deprivation in all its forms is no longer a viable factor” (Gill,
2005:3). This utopian goal should not blinker a much simpler and
urgent task: To work out principles and lines of action that
enable inclusion policies to be turned and provided with
sufficient force to be able to become promoters of true social
transformation.
5.1 The tools of inclusion policies
We are not starting from scratch. Critical reflection on the concepts
of inclusion has led to the formulation of several proposals aimed at
rethinking the politics of inclusion in a line of greater openness
towards more social and, above all, political considerations. In the
following paragraphs we sketch two proposals that come closest to
what we intend to develop.
Nancy Fraser (1996) considers that, at the present time, the policies
of social inclusion (labelled “identity policies”), require the
combination of three essential elements: Redistribution; recognition
and participation. Her proposal is based also on correcting
inequalities, suppressing discrimination mechanisms liable to block
inclusion and activating the public by involving them in collective
decision-making.
On a very different level, but with similar contents, we find the
“active inclusion” model formulated and spread by the European
Union (European Commission, 2008). Probably the severity of the
crisis and its consequences on the jobs market has driven this
supranational institution to abandon a previous model, which was
much more focused on occupation. Active inclusion is based on
three instruments:
1. Support for sufficient income to avoid social exclusion.
This implies the right to get sufficient resources to be able to
live according to human dignity, bearing in mind the person’s
active availability for work or occupational education.
2. Access to inclusive job markets.
Better access to the job market is to be promoted, favouring
help for personalised professional guidance and financial
incentives for job seekers and businesspeople.
3. Better access to quality social services.
This refers to the financial and territorial accessibility to and the
quality of the social services of general interest (support for
people, activities intended to bring people back into society and
the job market, and affordable childcare services).
In this case, activation does not refer to political participation, but
rather to participation in the jobs market. However, it is significant
the importance given to social policies, especially when
implemented as income transfers and social services.
5.2 Normative and operative principles of the
new inclusion policy
Our proposal stems from the criticism of a paradigm of inclusion,
which we have considered excessively focused on economics, not well
prepared for diversity and irrelevant from a political point of view. As
we have seen, from the confrontation of these problems with a series
of corrective elements, a new model of inclusion emerges, which
closer to reality and more operational from the political viewpoint.
This new understanding of the phenomenon of exclusion and the new
approach to inclusion policies go hand in hand with certain
normative and operative principles, displayed in the following table.
5. 5. Participatory democracy and Social inclusion:
Proposals for action
Departing from this we set out three guidelines for discerning the
type of participation we need in order to advance towards an
inclusive society:
• The principle of integration requires integral participation, in
the sense of not being limited to the commoditised sector of the
economy (departments of economic promotion, business
institutions, unions and professional guilds), but open to all
sectors of society and all its constituent public, private and
associative actors. Any government wishing to deal with
integration must include interdepartmental work (joined-up
government), interdepartmental work (multilevel government)
and the social players (network government). The complexity of
the social problems and of the corresponding integral policies
brings forth the need for strategic planning.
• The principle of equality requires egalitarian participation,
which does not simply offer equal opportunities for participation,
but seeks equal results in participation, in the sense of the
progressive reduction of socially constructed biases (of gender,
age, class, origin,...) in the participation rates across the
different areas of institutional democracy. This involves active
and passive suffrage for all citizens, including foreigners,
expression and defence of interests, control of institutional
output, processes of deliberation, public consultation, etc.
• The principle of empowerment requires empowering participation,
not controlled or principally sheltered by the institutions, but
sought and promoted from below, from the very society’s strength
to organise and to give itself socially owned material and cognitive
resources, thus contributing to the capacity building of social
groups in greater need. An empowering participation also
contemplates collaboration with the institutions, but without
waiving the critical perspective or the autonomy of the social actors.
5.2.1 Integral participation
Inclusion policies should foresee individualised and integral
interventions, capable of understanding the effects of exclusion that
might be caused by a certain interrelation of elements or factors on each
specific person. However, the very fragmentation and sharing of public
policies does not favour this kind of answer. Joined-up interventions are
still scarce and networking in the administration is still an exception.
There is a widespread belief that inclusion policies, in case they exist,
are the sole responsibility of the social and occupational services.
It is not at all easy to take the path from an eminently vertical type
of organisation to another that considers certain cross-cutting
logics. The path historically followed by an institution has modelled
a certain organisational culture, a way to see and do things that
strongly conditions new decision-making and the adoption of
changes. Therefore, a realistic model of organisational change will be
one that considers the inclusion of joined-up government an open
process, done in stages and looking in the long-term. To start with,
we should assume that joined-up government is, first and foremost,
a way of dealing work, based on certain habits that can be highly
beneficial for the organisation: consideration of others, consultation,
collaboration, sharing...
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Table 6: Participatory democracy as a response to the problems of inclusion
Problems of the
paradigm of inclusion
Economicist
Discriminatory
Insensitive
to inequality and
injustice
Integration
Equality
Empowerment
Participation of the administrative
units and the social actors
of the different sectors: economic,
educational, cultural, etc.
Levelling of real conditions
of public participation in a high qua-
lity democratic system
Increased participation of groups ex-
cluded or at risk of exclusion
in the different spheres
of collective life
• Joined-up government
• Multilevel government
• Relational government
• Strategic government
• Universal recognition of full
citizenship
• Egalitarian Participation,
Representation and Deliberation
• Control, follow-up and
participatory evaluation
of public policies
• Subsidiarity
• Economic democracy
• Democracy of knowledge
• Network society
Considering
all dimensions
of life
Recognition
of equality
in diversity
Social and
political
mobilisation
for inclusion
Corrective
elements
Regulatory principles
of inclusion
Implications for participation
in inclusion policies 
Operative principles of
participation for inclusion
Source: Author.
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The incorporation of joined-up government involves the
modernisation of the administration through a relational model
that also has creativity and an enterprising spirit as its assets.
This new model forces the basis of legitimacy and leadership to be
redefined, distributing responsibilities and building more shared
leaderships, with the management and political levels always
working in a network, and without losing sight of the importance
of substantive objectives. While preparing a substantive
mainstreaming policy, as would be the case of the inclusion
policy, it is advisable to move forward in building joined-up
government through the base, through spaces and instruments
that promote it (Brugué, Canal and Payà, 2010:170-171). This
would be the case of:
• Committees or commissions that enable an effective and
permanent coordination between the senior managers of the
administrations.
• Human resource policies favouring mobility, flexibility and
teamwork.
• Communication policies and collaborative work based in Web
2.0.
• Shared overview (area reports inserted in an overall corporate
report) and evaluation (systems of indicators) tools. While a
challenge, the joint creation of these tools might be a powerful
generator of joined-up culture, too.
• Mayoral offices capable of exercising impulse, coordination and
action overview (through strategic plans, mandate plans…), as
well as producing and managing applied knowledge.
• Management by projects. Starting with specific objectives and a
perfectly defined time and budgetary framework, projects allow
us to test and train people from different areas in
collaboration. A paradigmatic example of these kinds of projects
would be those that aim at the integral regeneration of a
district or neighbourhood, which imply intervention in
urbanism, housing, social services, culture, education, work,
security, etc.
• Citizen participation policies which, making a smart use of
pressures exerted from outside, may foster joining-up among
the most recalcitrant parts of the organisation.
However, joined-up government within each administration is not
enough. Papademedtriou touches a sore spot when he states that a
question “(...) that must be answered in all instances is how public
institutions -public schools, bureaucracies, public service delivery
agencies, police and judicial systems, political parties- can promote
inclusion (and reject exclusion) more effectively?” (Papademetriou,
2001:98). Some organisms and institutions with long experience in
the subject have already realised that they cannot fight alone in the
struggle against social inclusion, but that the complex local
networks, the network of public powers, the economic network and
the public network must be suitably articulated through the
leadership of the institution with most commitment and
responsibility, which in a city would be in most cases the municipal
government, provided there is one.
A good formula for building an integral, strategic response to the
problem of social exclusion would be to draw up and approve a
Local Plan of Social Inclusion. A plan of this kind requires an
accurate diagnosis to identify both the existing problems in the
community and the public, private or associative resources available
to deal with them (map of resources), a very firm commitment to
public participation designed to start up and feed the inclusion
governance networks, and finally a powerful system of indicators to
carefully monitor the evolution of exclusion and the impact of the
measures taken to promote inclusion. Although the tools can be
adapted in different ways, there are two key points which must be
assured to make it work: first of all, to assume a truly integral
perspective, both in work and with the players; secondly, to assume
a relational perspective that considers all interdependencies and
works to establish the necessary complicities, so that, beyond the
expected discrepancies around certain measures, all important
actors might share resources and information to achieve the best
possible Plan.
Figure 3. Network of players for social inclusion
in the city
Source: IGOP’s research team on Social Exclusion and Inclusion Policy
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network
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Schools
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associations Public network
• Associations of social
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collective)
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• Community associations
• NGOs
• Parents’ associations
• Individual, unassociated
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Political
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Social
movements
Social
employment firms
Cooperatives of
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Network of
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• Officials and
bureaucrats from
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5.2.2 Egalitarian participation
Egalitarian participation requires wider political reforms and
budgetary commitments, which are not only in the hands of the
local governments. Its achievement makes necessary to work at
least on the following three fronts:
• First of all, any kind of discrimination in the community with
regard to political rights would have to be eliminated, either
immediately or within a reasonable time span. This universal
recognition of full citizenship is particularly dependent on the
suitable regulation of the right of foreigners to active and
passive suffrage, which should only depend on the time they
have been living in their host country, registered as residents. 
• Secondly, mandates and procedures must be legally established
to enable the control, monitoring and participatory assessment of
public policy and also in the local area. These mandates should
be very flexible and adapt to each local reality, but the decision
on whether the governmental process is open to participation or
not, or on the kind of participation that is promoted or allowed,
should not be solely in the hands of the governments.
• Thirdly, changes must be promoted to allow more equal results to
be achieved in all key dimensions of democracy:
– In participation, aimed at eliminating the mentioned socio-
demographic biases of participation.
– In representation, with greater equality, in socio-demographic
terms, between the representatives and the represented people.
– In deliberation, guaranteeing that all important voices be
heard in public debates.
It is not easy to advance in the terrain of equal results. We have
already seen that the specific strategies and projects for nurturing
participation can fail simply because of the strong social cultural
and other types of biases that inevitably appear if there is no
intentional intervention to make participation reach other people
and other groups. Similarly to what happens in the process of social
exclusion, in this case too, the factors which hinder participation
are accumulative and progressively reduce the possibility of certain
kinds of persons having the chance to be heard in public affairs.
At this point, the model proposed by a group of British researchers
(Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker, 2006) aimed at reducing the
inequalities produced in political participation, in line with the
people’s levels of economic and cultural capital, seems very
interesting to us. The model is called CLEAR, an acronym of
• Can do. Having the resources and knowledge to be able to take
part.
• Like to. Having a sense of belonging to the community (which
makes participation sensible in the first place).
• Enabled to. Having effective opportunities for participation.
• Asked to. Being invited to take part by the administration and/or
by the non-governmental actors.
• Responded to. Obtaining some kind of evidence that the opinions
and proposals raised in the participatory process have received
some kind of consideration by the administration.
The following table gives a series of measures for moving forward in
the different dimensions proposed by the CLEAR model.
Can do Community development, education and development, as well as practical support –by providing social centres and
resources– for those groups and communities that might need a hand in finding and trusting their own voice.
Like to Helping to build a sense of community or neighbourhood. People must feel part of the community if they wish to feel
comfortable with participation.
Enabled to Creating channels for participation where it is possible to critically monitor the public policies and actions of governments,
where there might be representation from a wide range of interests and not only from certain privileged positions.
Investing in civic infrastructures and community networks.
Asked to Different systems of participation, reflective and capable of adapting, because each group will need a different kind of mo-
bilisation.
Responded to A political-administrative system with capacity to give an answer through specific products (e.g. reports of the participa-
tion processes), continuous learning and feedback.
Source: Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker  (2006).
Table 7: Policies for encouraging effective participation of the excluded or those at risk of exclusion
Key factor Policy Response 
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The type of participatory democracy implicit in the CLEAR model
seeks greater political equality as well as a more flexible, efficient
and effective approach to participation, so that the cost-benefit
balance of taking part in it is positive for an ever larger part of
society.
We see that in all of these changes the public institutions play a
very important role, but alone they are unable to achieve the
necessary transformations in society. To reach this point, it is
necessary that the community, that the people and the groups that
are not aware of their power and therefore do not exercise it, take a
step forward; not only to take a share of the power of those who
have too much of, but also to make it grow and use it differently.
5.2.3 Empowering participation
The concept of empowerment refers to people’s ability to be able to
become aware of their power, to assume, develop and to use it for
their life projects, in accordance with their values and concerns,
within a more extensive framework of social and community
relations that binds the individual and the collective dimensions of
life.
In aiming at inclusion, the excluded people, and also those at risk
of exclusion or the highly vulnerable, need to gain power. However,
not any kind power, but rather a power we understand in a wider
sense as capacity (knowledge and skills of all kinds) useful for
improving the quality of life of the individuals and communities
that get it.
This is a new kind of power that is necessarily relational and shared,
more cooperative than competitive, because the resources are
usually disperse (everybody has their strengths and weaknesses). For
its part, knowledge, even in such new areas as information and
communication technologies, is generated through personal contact
and exchange within the local system itself and between local
systems26. We are talking about a power that must be soft in form
but solid in its effects.
And how is this power to be generated? Basically it is to be done
through society’s self organisation, through all kinds of informal
groups, collectives, entities, federations and networks. Public
administrations have to promote it, they have to encourage it and,
above all, they must not prevent it.
In the present context of crisis, we are seeing how the non-
governmental organizations can respond effectively to more
complicated social situations through commitment, innovation,
efficiency and an enormous capacity to bring forth and value the
community's resources, while generating cohesion among people and
groups. They normally do all of this keeping a loyal collaboration
with institutions in all kinds of social programs and services, but
without losing the critical perspective on institutions and society,
which often makes them one of the few public voices in defence of
the rights of the excluded. The declaration of the institutions of the
so-called Third Sector of Social Action of Spain is an example of this
positive and proactive role that the NGOs are called to play27.
Exploring the endeavour of building a more powerful society, we
acknowledge spaces that have been considered so far as a domain
26 Zinnbauer’s thoughts (Zinnbauer, 2007) are very stimulating on this point.
27 The full text of the declaration is in an annex at the end of the document.
Zero-sum, strengthening Mutually expansive, enhancing 
some over others, dividing the skills of all those involved.
what already exists It is creative and generates
new energies and possibilities
A one-way force: you either A dialectic relationship in
have it or you don't. both directions. Nobody is ever
Life is essentially a fight of impotent because the actions
the powerful against the of each person affect others
weak
Limiting and intimidating; it Freeing
causes fear
Dominant and controlling Collaborative
Rigid, static Dynamic, always changing
Derived principally from Derived from relations, 
laws, status, force and knowledge, experience,
wealth number of people, organisation, 
creativity, vision, perseverance
discipline, humour...
All I can do or achieve now Sure of creating and
maintaining relational power
in time
Source: adapted from Moore Lappé,
2010:93.
Table 8: Rethinking power
Power is... Power can be...
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of the market and therefore reserved for profit-making companies.
While recognising the essential role of private business in
generating wealth and jobs, we believe it is necessary to claim the
concept of social enterprise to refer to all projects and initiatives
that enable material and immaterial wealth to be generated from
eminently social views, objectives and motivations.
Cities require social enterprises to delve into the potentials of the
cooperative economy to generate alternative spaces and networks of
production, distribution and consumption: alternative referring to
ownership, referring to the distribution of burdens and benefits, and
referring to the commitment towards society, too, defending and
realising values such as work, equity, solidarity and sustainability.
One final aspect to be borne in mind in a strategy of empowerment
is the creation of autonomous areas of communication in society,
capable of channelling powerful flows of communication between
people and groups, and of producing and disseminating an
alternative way of seeing and making sense of reality. To achieve
this, it will be necessary to use both the “traditional” channels that
came in the first wave of modernity (community newspapers, radios
and televisions) but adapted to current needs, and above all the
new channels based on ICT that offer powerful and quite affordable
tools to articulate participatory networks.
The concept of community empowerment refers, in short, to
articulating the network society, putting value on its assets, seeking
out what is lacking and linking it all together in a virtuous circle of
individual and collective growth.
5.3 An inclusive democracy is a living
democracy
We started this text in a pessimistic tone, by stating a series of
global phenomena and tendencies that might endanger and spoil
the cohesion, security and welfare of cities everywhere.
Nevertheless, when considering alternatives, pessimism is not the
recipe or the solution to anything; it does not mobilize, but quite
the contrary, it can paralyse the social actors and kill off their
initiatives. There are more and more people who call for the
pressing problems of the world, dramatic in many cases, to be dealt
with from optimism; not a kind of optimism based on
disinformation and stupidity, but rather on the passionate
conviction of the resilience of vital systems, including human
communities.
In a very recent work that combines an original theoretical
approach to the social and ecological questions with a strong
practical sense, the North American author Frances Moore-Lappé
(Moore-Lappé, 2010) comes down on abundance as a means for
changing the way we see our communities. The model of democracy
she refers to is extraordinarily simple, a living democracy, built by
autonomous people that are committed to the values of freedom
and equality and are capable of acting together to make these
values prevail.
1. Am I expanding and extending power?
Does my action create greater awareness and new power that
strengthens my own and others' skills?
Does my action reduce the imbalances of power? Is it
contributing to making a merely punctual correction or
ensuring that fairer, more effective decisions are taken?
Does the responsibility flow in a single direction or are there
multiple parties that assume responsibility and are
accountable?
2. Am I relieving the fear of change and the fear of the
other?
Am I giving an example that it is good to be fearful when
we face something new?
Am I my helping to change the stereotypes, by receiving and
enhancing diversity?
Am I contributing to building group links that strengthen
courage, without excluding other people?
3. Am I learning and teaching the arts of democracy?
Is my effort aimed at teaching and practising active
listening, the creative use of conflicts, continuous
evaluation, assessment and other essential habits for being
effective?
4. Am I creating a movement that is sustainable?
Is the initiative being intrinsically gratifying, with large
doses of real learning, humour, beauty, celebration and
companionship?
Is the initiative being sufficiently visible for those who are
outside the circle to feel encouraged to act?
Note: Checklist of a living democracy
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5.4 The positive impacts of democratic
participation on the dimensions of social
inclusion: an inventory of policies
In this last point, we want to give a range of specific inclusion
policies that could be carried out from local governments and
which include an integral, egalitarian and empowering
participation29. These are actions which are largely within reach of
local governments, and it essentially depends on the political will
of their leaders to introduce them.
5.4.1 Local participative policies for active political
citizenship
Justification
• Participation is essential for the exercise of citizenship. Local
administration’s proximity makes it a strong candidate for
developing participation in all of its variants.
• Participation favours social inclusion in so far as: 1. in
principle, it enables all voices to be heard; 2. it generates a
sense of responsibility towards society; 3. it relates different
people and groups and promotes mutual recognition.
Definition within models of democracy
• Representative: a political representation that is vocational,
responsible, transparent and adapted to the will of the electoral
body.
• Direct: mechanisms through which the citizens can decide on
certain public questions, without mediators.
• Participatory: spaces for deliberation and dialogue, open to the
social players and citizens in general.
• Communitarian: associations and groups created to defend the
common interest, ensuring that the democratic institutions work
correctly by monitoring, complaint and, if necessary,
denunciation.
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Encouraging a modification of local legislation to: 1. Advance
towards decentralisation, 2. Guarantee immigrants the right to
vote, 3. Improve representation, and 4. Establish effective
participative mechanisms of control and evaluation of the local
government.
• Creating different spaces of participation applicable to all areas
of local policy, but also considering criteria of economy,
efficiency and efficacy. It must be remembered that participation
is not an end in itself, but rather a means to personal and social
development.
5.4.2 Local participative policies for access to employment
Justification
• The undemocratic essence of the capitalist corporation is the
main cause of the unequal distribution of employment and
income, as well as of workers’ alienation towards their work.
• The same could be said of the difficulties people encounter in
achieving credit if they fail to fall within a certain social profile.
• The centrality of paid work hinders recognition of the reality of
unpaid reproductive work, which is basic for the well functioning
of society. The lack of social recognition of this income-free work
is an additional factor of exclusion for people doing it full-time.
Definition within models of democracy
• Participatory: availability of spaces that enable workers’ voices to
be brought into substantive aspects of the management of
corporations, including the reconciliation between productive and
reproductive work, to achieve a more equitable and socially
efficient distribution.
• Communitarian: co-operative companies devoted to the
production, distribution and consumption of basic goods and
services; credit co-operatives to support the establishment of
new companies, housing co-operatives, etc. managed and
controlled by people with few resources; networks for the
exchange of products, services or time.
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Ensuring the proper functioning of collective bargain with the
representatives of the public workers; pushing the agenda of
inclusion beyond the habitual conflict on salaries.
29 It is not our intention to make an inventory of all possible inclusion policies, but
only those that explicitly relate inclusion to participation.
5. Am I replacing the limiting frame for one that gives us
power?
Am I helping to replace the fundamental presumption of
shortage for that of abundance?
Am I helping to replace the belief in fixed economic laws
with confidence in human creativity?
Am I refocusing on the goodness of human nature, our needs
for connection, justice and effectiveness, which we can use
to heal the planet? 
Source: Moore Lappé, 2010:165.
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• Encouraging the participation of the workers in private
companies, in application of the principle of corporate social
responsibility.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the initiatives of
co-operative production, credit and consumption emanating from
the community, and other types of social networks related to
people’s paid or unpaid work.
5.4.3 Local participative policies for recognition and non-
discrimination
Justification
• The possibility of discriminating against someone is inversely
proportional to the availability of political power for the person
or group. Therefore, discrimination is often reflected in the
prohibition or practical impossibility of exercising participation.
• Without suitable legal protection of the rights of minorities and
a political representation that reflects approximately their weight
in the total population, the situation of discrimination cannot be
eradicated.
Definition within models of democracy
• Representative: recognition of active and passive suffrage for all
persons born in the country, whatever their family’s origin, and
for all persons having resided in the country for reasonable
amount of time.
• Participatory: availability of a place for the discriminated group's
voice to be expressed and heard, to reinforce or compensate for
the (provisional) absence of political rights.
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Backing the reform of the electoral law, starting with the right to
vote in municipal elections.
• Campaigns to encourage participation among the discriminated
groups already entitled to vote, but which vote very little, either
due to lack of knowledge or to a feeling of political inefficacy.
• Adoption of respect for diversity as a principle of the
government's political action.
• Creation of municipal councils of participation that allow those
groups to express themselves and watch out for their interests.
5.4.4 Local participative policies for access to public services
and social protection
Justification
• The degree of inclusiveness (which is equal to coverage plus
intensity plus flexibility) of the public services depends largely
on political decisions at the highest level, but also on how these
decisions are applied and how the services are managed day by
day. In this point, the participation of the users in monitoring,
controlling and assessing the services may be crucial.
• On the other hand, it is almost impossible to protect the whole
of the population with State funds alone. In many circumstances,
the involvement of family, group or community networks can be
faster, more efficient and more effective.
Definition within models of democracy
• Participatory: availability of spaces allowing the citizens/users’
voices to be brought into the monitoring, control and
assessment of public services.
• Communitarian: strengthening of social entities and networks
based on reciprocity, capable of offering protection and help, if
needed.
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Creating or encouraging the creation of councils of users to
watch over the quality of the public services.
• Adapting the public services to the diversity of their potential
users.
• According supports and mutual obligations with initiatives of
social protection and aid emanating from the community.
5.4.5 Local participative policies for the access to education
and culture
Justification
• The school is the first vital experience of participation beyond
the family.
• Education is something that regards the whole community (a
well-known African proverb says that “a whole village is needed
to educate one child”).
• Education and culture provide the basic resources to get along
in life, adapting to the requirements of the knowledge economy
and society.
• Culture is not something given and static that one has to
assume blindly, but something created by people and therefore
criticisable, modifiable and adaptable to new circumstances and
needs. In this sense, participation is essential for culture to
reflect the whole spiritual wealth of society and to prevent the
creation of untouchable spaces, behind which crude particular
interests might be hidden.
Definition within models of democracy
• Participatory: bodies for facilitating the participation of all
players involved in the educational processes; at the level of the
local educational community and in each school. Bodies for
enhancing public participation in the public media to thus
ensure their plurality.
• Community: generation, through associations and informal
groups, of new educational and cultural projects, liable to
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generate value, and alternative models that question the
hegemonic values and models.
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Municipal school council with the involvement of all schools.
Living, dynamic school councils.
• School zoning hindering practices that lead to school
segregation.
• Specific support for those schools bringing a strong commitment
to diversity within their classrooms.
• Specific supports for pupils with family and/or economic
difficulties.
• Ensuring that schools adopt pedagogical objectives and
practices (group work, student assemblies, etc.) favouring
inclusion.
• Creating a body for the representation of the public in the
media.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the educational
and cultural initiatives arising from the community.
5.4.6 Local participative policies for producing social capital
Justification
• People do not find it easy to move beyond their personal (work,
studies...) and family routines, which absorb their time and
energy. To generate a social network, extending the potential
contacts and resources within reach, it is first necessary to break
down the walls of indifference and suspicion of others. 
• In this sense, few things are more effective for binding people of
different origins than having a shared activity or working for a
common purpose. However, someone has to lead and organise
this and spaces and resources must be provided.
Definition within models of democracy
• Participatory: availability of public spaces where people can
meet, share things and possibly establish lasting relationships.
• Community: associations or informal groups enabling experiences
to be shared and projects to be carried out around a space or
activity. 
Instruments for applying it at the local level
• Creating public spaces in the open air (squares, parks...) and
under cover (Civic Centres, old and young people's centres,
swimming pools,...), to enable and encourage people to meet in
shared activities (parties, markets, fairs, competitions,...)
organised by the council or, preferably, by users themselves.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the community
initiatives intended to strengthen links between people from the
same district, of the same age or with the same hobby, sport,
etc.
Table 9: The positive impacts of public participation on the dimensions of social inclusion
Inclusion dimension Models of democracy Instruments for applying it at the local level
Inclusion as citizenship
(political rights;
participation in public
decisions)
Inclusion as occupation
(access to paid work:
occupation + income)
• Representative: a political representation that is
vocational, responsible, transparent and adapted to
the will of the electoral body.
• Direct: mechanisms through which the citizens can
decide on certain public questions, without mediators.
• Participatory:  spaces for deliberation and dialogue,
open to the social players and citizens in general.
• Communitarian: associations and groups created to
defend the common interest, ensuring that the
democratic institutions work correctly by monitoring,
complaint and, if necessary, denunciation.
• Participatory: availability of spaces that enable
workers’ voices to be brought into substantive aspects
of the management of corporations, including the
reconciliation of productive work with the
reproductive to achieve a more equitable, socially
efficient distribution.
• Communitarian: co-operative companies devoted to
the production, distribution and consumption of basic
• Encouraging a modification of local legislation to:
1. Advance towards decentralisation, 2. Guarantee
immigrants the right to vote, 3. Improve
representation, and 4. Establish effective
participative mechanisms of control and evaluation
of the municipal management.
• Creating different spaces of participation applicable
to all areas of local policy, but also considering
criteria of economy, efficiency and efficacy. It must
be remembered that participation is not an end in
itself, but rather a means to personal and social
development.
• Ensuring the proper functioning of collective bargain
with the representatives of the public workers,
pushing the agenda of inclusion beyond the habitual
conflict on salaries. 
• Encouraging the participation of the workers in
private companies, in application of the principle of
corporate social responsibility.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the
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Inclusion dimension Models of democracy Instruments for applying it at the local level
Inclusion as recognition
(absence of
discrimination)
Inclusion as protection
(access to public services
and social protection)
Inclusion as education
(access to education
and culture)
Inclusion as bonding
(links and social
networks: social capital)
goods and services; credit co-operatives to support
the establishment of new companies, housing co-
operatives, etc. managed and controlled by people
with few resources; networks for the exchange of
products, services or time.
• Representative: recognition of active and passive
suffrage for all people born in the country, whatever
their family’s origin, or having resided there for a
time.
• Participatory: availability of a place for the
discriminated group's voice to be expressed and heard,
to reinforce or compensate for the (provisional)
absence of political rights.
• Participatory: availability of spaces allowing the
citizens/users’ voices to be brought into the
monitoring, control and assessment of public services.
• Communitarian: strengthening of social entities and
networks based on reciprocity, capable of offering
protection and help, if needed.
• Participatory: bodies for facilitating the participation
of all players involved in the educational processes.
From the educational community and each school.
Bodies for enhancing public participation in the
public media to thus ensure their plurality.
• Community: generation, through associations and
informal groups, of educational and cultural projects
liable to generate value, and alternative models that
question the hegemonic values and models.
• Participatory: availability of public spaces where
people can meet, share things and possibly establish
lasting relationships.
• Community: associations or informal groups enabling
experiences to be shared and projects to be carried
out around a space or activity.
initiatives of co-operative production, credit and
consumption emanating from the community, and
other types of social networks related to people’s
paid or unpaid work.
• Backing the reform of the electoral law, starting
with the right to vote in municipal elections.
• Campaigns to encourage participation among the
discriminated groups already entitled to vote, but
which vote very little, either due to lack of
knowledge or a feeling of political inefficacy.
• Adoption of respect for diversity as a principle of
the government's political action.
• Creation of municipal councils of participation that
allow these groups to express themselves and watch
out for their interests.
• Creating or encouraging the creation of councils of
users that watch over the quality of the public
services:
• Adapting the public services to the diversity of their
potential users.
• According supports and mutual obligations with
community initiatives of protection and social aid.
• Municipal school council with the involvement of all
schools. Living, dynamic school councils.
• School zoning hindering practices that lead to
school segregation.
• Specific support for those schools bringing a strong
commitment to diversity within their classrooms.
• Specific supports for pupils with family and/or
economic difficulties.
• Ensuring that schools adopt pedagogical objectives
and practices (group work, student assemblies, etc.)
favouring inclusion.
• Creating a body for the representation of the public
in the media.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the
educational and cultural initiatives arising from the
community.
• Creating public spaces in the open air (squares,
parks...) and under cover (Civic Centres, old and
young people's centres, swimming pools,...), to
enable and encourage people to meet in shared
activities (parties, markets, fairs, competitions,...)
organised by the council or, preferably, their own
users.
• According supports and mutual obligations with the
community initiatives intended to strengthen links
between people from the same district, of the same
age or with the same hobby, sport...
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Social inclusion is a concept that has been very successful in
redefining the objectives of social policy in the light of the
challenges of new times, characterised by accelerated change,
mobility, instability and fragmentation on all levels: in the
economy, in society and in the life course of each individual.
Citizen participation is also widely accepted, and is considered a
form of saving democracy from its growing distancing and
ineffectiveness regarding the problems and concerns of the citizens.
Progress has been made in the respect for human rights by
incorporating the mentioned concepts in the discourses and, to a
smaller extent, in governmental practices, but this has obviously
not been sufficient to put an end to social exclusion or to do away
with the deficits of democratic quality. Progress has been selective
and has come with many situations of stagnation or even
regression, shown for example in the deterioration of working
conditions and basic services, or in the denial of political rights.
The situation cannot be attributed only to the present economic
crisis. In addition to increasing the number of victims, the crisis
has certainly reduced the government’s capacities on all levels to
deal with the problems through public policies. However, most
policies had already been weakened by a lack of true commitment
on the part of many governments and by approaches that see the
market as the only possible valid form of social regulation.
How can we explain such a difference between discourses and
realities? Maybe the problem has to be sought in the fact that we
have taken for granted that the concepts of social inclusion and
participatory democracy corresponded to unequivocal, obvious
meanings for the whole world. This is clearly not the case. As we
have seen, there are different ways of understanding democracy, and
each one provides a different idea of exclusion and inclusion. Even
public participation can obey very different focuses and
motivations: from work for (re)generating the public sphere to the
effective defence of private interests. The umbrella of social
inclusion can also hide realities such as the stigmatisation of all
those who fail to follow a person, family or community’s "correct"
(working/social/cultural) model, with such terrible consequences as
assimilation, marginalization or elimination.
This is why we believe that social inclusion and participatory
democracy only make sense as political objectives committed to the
recognition of others (of equality in difference) and to civil,
political and social rights for everyone. But these are objectives
which also enable the application of highly diverse institutional and
non-institutional instruments.
To the specific question of whether the existence of a more
participatory democracy is a necessary condition for advancing
towards more inclusive societies, we have reached the conclusion
that this bond exists and is given in all spheres of social life (work,
public services, education, neighbourhood’s life…). What's more,
there is no possible inclusion in urban societies without
participation. There may be powerful social policies that achieve a
certain, always weakened, redistribution of income and wealth on
the basis of transfers; nevertheless, without true involvement of the
excluded people in the process intended to lead to their inclusion,
it will all be but a mirage. There will be no real transformation
because it will not be based on people's autonomy.
How to ensure that the excluded or those at risk of exclusion take
action? First of all, by recognising and accepting the differences in
the framework of equality, secondly by eliminating the social
structures causing inequality and thirdly, by not braking or
discouraging the initiatives of these groups, even though they
might not fully respond to the models of the dominant society.
Furthermore, there are many community initiatives that generate
public value and deserve to be encouraged and helped by the public
authorities with economic and/or with technical support. It is also
positive to engage into joint service production with the public
authorities and also, logically, to channel collective demands and
pressure for improving the services provided by the institutions.
There must therefore be a double inclusion strategy: recognition of
rights (social citizenship) and promotion of group and community
self-organisation (empowerment).
By making a map of specific proposals for starting up this strategy
in a local context, we find a constellation of alternatives where the
solution is neither to apply a pure market-based model, which has
been shown to fail, nor to return to the protective social State,
6. Conclusions
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which is excessively rigid and stifles social autonomy, but rather to
turn to a model that enhances the improvement of the public
sector, the market and the third sector to strengthen what is public:
public values, public services, public spaces... as a basis for social
inclusion. For a public sphere must be created day by day, bringing
in participation in different formats, adapted to the context and to
the public, private and social actors that need to be involved.
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Declaration of the Third Social Action Sector:
For a Strategy of Social inclusion
2011 – 2020.
The institutions of the Third Social Action Sector,
represented on the NGO Platform of Social Action, the
Spanish Volunteering Platform and the European Network
for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion in the
Spanish state, meeting on 30 September and 1 October
at the Third Social Action Sector Convention 2010:
WE HEREBY REPORT
The infringement by the member states of the targets set in the
Lisbon Strategy 2000-2010, and especially regarding the eradication
of poverty.
WE NOTE
That the present crisis has not only alarmingly increased the rates
of unemployment, but that its main consequence has been to
increase poverty in our country. This translates into worse
conditions of life for many people who were already in a state of
exclusion, and the appearance of social insecurity affecting new
groups of population and leaving them in a state of vulnerability.
Everything also seems to indicate that if serious measures are not
taken urgently, this tendency will get worse.
That the more than fifteen years of high rates of economic growth
that we have enjoyed in the country have not only failed to reduce
both relative and severe poverty rates, but have also increased the
inequalities between the richer and poorer segments of the
population. The greatest recent period of economic bonanza in our
country has therefore been wasted without correcting the structural
problems that are at the root of exclusion or making a suitable
social distribution of wealth.
That the measures that are currently being taken to climb out of the
crisis, which are determined by control of the financial markets and
cause a drastic reduction in social expenditure, not only clearly
jeopardise the quality of life and well-being of many citizens, but
also lead to a reduction in rights and more severe poverty and
deprivation for people in a state of poverty, and are harmful to
economic and financial recovery.
WE REMIND
That inequality, poverty and social exclusion not only harm the
quality of our democracy, but also cast doubt on the values and
principles behind it, and therefore to have adequate social
protection to guarantee all people’s well-being and their dignity of
life is an aspiration that cannot be cast aside for our society, but
rather takes on yet more importance in times of crisis.
That it is the obligation of the public powers to effectively
guarantee fundamental rights for all people. These rights include
the right to a reasonable life, which requires sufficient income and
services to be able to live adequately and protection to provide
life expectancy and the capacity for free, independent decision-
making.
That inequality has become the main characteristic of an
unstable, globally unsustainable society. Economic development
only makes sense if at the service of people's well-being; it is
therefore essential to grow in a more equitable way, in search of
the well-being that includes economic, political, social and
environmental factors, in which priority is given not only on the
level of the country's income but also on its distribution, and on
the activity outside the market as well as non economic aspects
such as education, health, democratic quality, security and
environment.
That an society is economically unsustainable, democratically unfair
and socially immoral in which inequalities are not only aggravated
but many groups of people, including children and young people,
do not have the essential resources to be able to have reasonable
lives.
Annex
That the role of the Third Social Action Sector is fundamental for
containing the most negative effects of the crisis on the more
vulnerable groups. The Third Sector can also play an essential role both
in maintaining and developing social cohesion and in a sustainable
recovery, provided its potential and added value are used correctly.
WE CALL
For a State Agreement on Social Inclusion to be reached in the
coming decade, in which all of the administrations are committed
and which actively involves the social players, and especially the
Third Sector, thus strengthening its role in society. This State
Agreement, which must be led by the Central Government, requires
broad social and political consensus and must fundamentally seek
another model of development in which the structural tendencies
causing exclusion are inverted.
For Social Inclusion Plans to be developed within the European
Union Strategy 2020 both on the national level and in the regions
and local areas which exceed the Strategy’s targets. These plans
must be a substantial improvement over those developed in the past
decade, so that they have clearer objectives, suitable resources,
information systems and pertinent monitoring, as well as suitable
involvement on the part of the social organisations.
For them to be made effective, guarantee and delve further into the
social rights for all people, recognised both in the European Union
Treaty and in the Spanish Constitution and statutes of autonomy.
Therefore, an agreement for social inclusion is proposed on the
highest level of the state and with the commitment of all
administrations to develop the general right to inclusion and
guarantee that all people have their basic needs covered and have
the necessary support for promotion. This agreement must contain
the minimal services or portfolio of services that the different
administrations must define and guarantee as part of their
competencies. This agreement implies the commitment to have
inclusion plans in which specific measures, quantifiable objectives
and adequate resources are established, bearing in mind the needs
and characteristics of each territory.
That within the framework of the European Year for Combating
Poverty and Social Exclusion there should be a public commitment
translating into the clear, determined will on the part of institutions
to eradicate poverty in the next decade, at least in its extreme
forms, and to achieve substantially lower inequalities, instability
and vulnerability, making personal development and well-being a
fundamental objective of the economic policies. This commitment
must be translated into clear targets, sufficient budgets and suitable
monitoring systems.
That the social budget percentage should be increased to 27%, so
further funds will be needed following the constitutional principles
of progressiveness and equality. This requires the elimination of the
so-called frauds, especially by the least supportive, the privileged
tax systems for high capitals and the rationalisation of expenditure
based on social welfare criteria.
WE PROMISE
To increase our efforts in working for a fairer society by defining the
rights of the weakest, by reporting situations of injustice,
discrimination and marginalization and solidly fighting to promote
all people, and especially those who more largely suffer from
exclusion.
To work closely with all public administrations and all economic and
social players, taking an active part in the conception, performance,
monitoring and assessment of inclusion policy, and providing all
potential and assets of our entities and strengthening our role as a
spokesperson and social player. We accept the joint responsibility in
encouraging, monitoring and defending the measures that are the
result of consensus with the Third Social Action Sector.
To work in conjunction and coordination both nationally and in the
autonomic and local areas with the entities of the Third Social
Action Sector, increasing our coordination and starting up the
necessary processes for this collaboration to be close, coordinated
and that it might strengthen each entity’s work.
We are firmly convinced that in this way we will be able to improve
our mission, for we move with the same values, we are involved in
the same objectives and we can better develop our potential as a
social player.
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